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Renosterveld is a critically threatened ecosystem. Eighty percent of the remammg 
fragments are located, mainly on privately-owned farms, in Cape Floristic Region, South 
Africa. Fifty-eight landowners were interviewed about their opinion towards incentives 
for preserving the renosterveld on their farms, from which it was concluded that a suite of 
conservation incentives are needed to conserve renosterveld, rather than a single 
incentive or group of similar incentives. All landowners suggested that they were likely 
to conserve the renosterveld on their farms. Although opportunity costs exist, both the 
perceived opportunity cost of renosterveld and the current cost of conserving renosterveld 
are low; renosterveld should therefore not be regarded as threatened. However, the 
remaining renosterveld fragments remain at risk if land-use is changed and protective 
legislation is not adhered to. 
A property rate rebate as an incentive for the conservation of renosterveld would only 
marginally be of financial benefit to landowners. It would be an important incentive in 
the symbolic and psychological message it gives to landowners that the local government 
is both appreciative of their conservation efforts and serious about conservation. The cost 
to local municipalities of offering a property rebate is minimal, but the challenge is to 
convince municipalities of the need to offer such a rebate in spite of the numerous urgent 
social issues they face. 
Motivational incentives such as support through the agricultural extension system, public 
acknowledgement and education would be of benefit, but the farmer's sense of heritage, 
family and connection to the land as well as social approval, have potentially a large role 
to play in motivating people actively to collaborate in the conservation of this indigenous 
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1. CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
The Cape Floristic Region (CFR) is a biodiversity hotspot (Myers el at., 2000) and has a 
serial World Heritage Site comprising of eight natural properties. The CFR has high 
endemism and unexpectedly high species richness (Linder, 2003) and the importance of 
its conservation and the strategies and action plans to do so are well documented 
(Gelderblom et al., 2003; Cowling et aI., 2003a; Pressey et at.. 2003). 
Cape Lowlands Renosterveld, a highly threatened ecosystem within the CFR, occurs in 
the more fertile lowlands where the relatively more nutrient rich soils have for centuries 
been ploughed for agriculture (Adamson, 1938). Generally economically productive areas 
are less preserved (Pressey, 1994) and renosterveld has less than 4% remaining and less 
than 2% protected (Rebelo, 1992a; Kemper et at., 2000; von Hase el at., 2003). The 
subsidisation of cereals in the 1980s and the more recent expansion of the wine industry 
has meant further loss of renosterveld (Fairbanks et aI., 2004) which is now considered 
'\ 00% irreplaceable' and a high priority area for conservation (Pressey et aI., 1993; 
Cowling et al., 2003b; Rebelo, 1992a). 
There is no common definition of renosterveld but it is best described as small leaved 
shrublands dominated by Electropappus rhinocerotis (renosterbos) (Boucher, 1980) with 
a prevalence of annuals and geophytes, but with lower endemism than the fynbos 
shrub lands of the CFR (Cowling & Holmes, 1992; Moll et at., 1984; Rebelo, I 992b). 
Renosterveld has some local traditional plant use and it is believed there is potential 
cosmetic and medicinal value, but its value lies mainly in biodiversity and existence 
value. 
Habitat loss through change in land use is one of the biggest threats to biodiversity loss 
(Cowling et a/. , 2003c) and in the CFR, agriculture is by far the most significant agent of 
habitat transformation (Latimer et al., 2004). Invasive alien vegetation is also a main 
threat to biodiversity loss with dense stands of woody aliens having transformed 1.6% of 










and alien vegetation infestation, renosterveld is also threatened by urbanisation and 
population growth, unsustainable harvesting and inappropriate land-use planning 
(Rebelo, 1992b; Rouget et al.. 2003; Kemper et aI., 1999; von Hase et aI., 2003) and 
potentially climate change (Bomhard et ai., 2005). 
There are approximately 53 533 hectares of Cape lowland renosterveld in the CFR and an 
estimated total of 18 000 remnants with most of them smaller than a hectare (von Hase et 
aI., 2003). Irrespective of whether 2% (Low & Jones, 1994), 3% (McDowell, 1988) or 
4% of the original area of renosterveld remains, it is critical to conserve all remnants of 
renosterveld regardless of their size (Cowling et aI., 2003c). Spontaneous regeneration on 
old fields, after 35 years, indicated lower species richness and diversity than adjacent 
intact habitat (Krug et aI., 2004b). 
More than 80% of these remaining renosterveld fragments are on private lands, mainly 
belonging to farmers (McDowell, 1988; Wynberg, 2002). If we wish to keep what little 
remains, incentives must be sought to encourage these private landowners to conserve it. 
The need for conservation outside nature reserves on private lands is well recognised 
(Hale & Lamb, ] 997) but on private lands the challenge lies in accommodating both the 
rights of landowners to be economically productive, while at the same time protecting 
biodiversity (Norton, 2000). Conservation biologists need to playa critical role in private 
land conservation (Knight, 1999) and while it is believed that an ethical appeal should be 
made to private landowners to expand their duty of care as custodians of nature 
(Heydenrych et al., 1995; Gelderblom et ai., 2003), Australian farmers believe that they 
have demonstrated a stewardship with the land for generations (National Farmers 
Federation Australia (NFF), 2003). Private landowners feel that they should not be 
expected to bear all the costs for what essentially is a benefit for public good and the 
broader community (Doremus, 2003). 
Conservation on private lands initially failed to meet all objectives because it did not 
understand the views of private landowners nor appreciate the implications of regulating 











2003). More recently an attempt has been made to try and understand these views and to 
ascertain what motivates private landowners to retain their natural lands. Private 
landowners are motivated by intrinsic factors such as aesthetic appreciation, having an 
attachment to their land and giving the impression their farm is well managed (Erickson 
et al., 2002, Ryan et al., 2003). Farming is described as an emotional enterprise 
'governed by a complex set of values, experience and perceptions, including a strong 
emotional component' where farmers are connected to the sense of place, 'passed on and 
usually deepened from generation to generation' (Koelle & Oettle, 2003). 
In South Africa the advent of the new government saw the deregulation of control and the 
virtual elimination of subsidies (Pence et at., 2003). Conservation in agriculture changed 
from soil conservation to broader concepts of conservation supporting ecological farming 
practises (Donaldson, 2002; Gelderblom et at., 2003). In addition to this, a contentious 
issue facing private landowners is the Government Land Reform Programme. Land is an 
issue in South Africa as land ownership favours a racial minority and land tenure issues 
are not fully resolved (Wynberg, 2002; Milton et at., 2003). On private lands it is "not 
ecological challenges which lie ahead but socio-political challenges which may be a 
bigger hurdle to overcome" (MacDonald, 1994). 
The necessity to conserve the renosterveld is well documented but is not evident to most 
private landowners. Private landovvners are not encouraged to leave their virgin land 
unploughed nor to restore their lands (Milton et al., 2003). While several types of 
incentives are possible to induce South African farmers to conserve renosterveld, one 
possibility that has received much attention is that of using a property rate rebate (Botha, 
2001). The Local Government Property Rates Act [lvo 6 of 2004] was introduced to 
standardise the way properties are valued for rating purposes and to regulate the power of 
a municipality to impose rates on property. This provides an opportunity for local 
governments to exempt or rebate property taxes as an incentive for land set aside for 
conservation. Any subsidies or tax exemptions to landowners for conservation would be 











The aim of this study was to investigate the current financial and motivational incentives 
and disincentives for conserving renosterveld on private farm lands. The following four 
key questions were addressed: 
I. What proportion of farmers with renosterveld fragments plan to keep or transform 
these fragments? 
2. What are the direct and indirect opportunity costs of maintaining these fragments? 
3. What incentives would motivate farmers to conserve fragments? 
4. Are property rate rebates or exemptions a viable incentive tool for conservation 
from the perspective of both local government and the private landholder? 
Chapter 2 reviews the viability and relevance ofpriva te land incentives, as well as 
property tax as a viable conservation incentive (key questions 3 and 4). Chapter 3 
provides the background to understanding the policies and legislation that protect 
renosterveld and their relevance in answering the key questions. Chapter 4 describes the 
methodology used. In Chapter 5 the results of the quantitative analysis are presented, with 
each key question addressed sequentially. The findings of the qualitative analysis are 
addressed within the broad context of private land owners, motivation and incentives. 











2. CHAPTER 2: A REVIEW OF INCENTIVES AS A MECHANISM FOR 
ACHIEVING CONSERVATION ON PRIVATE LANDS 
2.1 Introduction 
While conservation has traditionally been approached through regulatory measures in the 
past, there has been a recent shift in South African policy and regulation to adopt 
incentive schemes to achieve conservation aims. This chapter addresses two of the key 
questions. Firstly the definition and role of incentives in both the global and local context 
are reviewed in addressing the key question: "what incentives would motivate or 
influence a landowners' decision to conserve?" Secondly tax and more specifically 
property rate tax are reviewed in addressing the key question: "is a property rate rebate or 
exemption a viable incentive measure for conservation?" 
An incentive is something that arouses feeling, or incites to action (Shorter Oxford 
English Dictionary) and conservation incentives are rewards which encourage actions 
(Crosthwaite, 2000). A disincentive discourages good conservation behaviour, while a 
perverse incentive encourages undesirable behaviour (McNeely, J 988). 
Economic incentives were initially proposed because institutions, research and legislation 
were failing to achieve conservation goals (McNeely, 1988). Economic incentives have 
been widely researched and are one approach to conserving biodiversity on private lands 
and have developed because they can achieve conservation actions on private land at a 
lower cost to government than traditional regulatory approaches (McNeely, 1988; 
Bateson, 200 I; Langholz et ai., 2000; Doremus, 2003). Incentives should be integrated 
into a legislated and supportive institutional framework (Wells, 1998; OECD, 2004). 
Economic disincentives such as polluter taxes discourage environmentally undesirable 
behaviour (Anderson et ai., 1977; Constanzo & Daly, 1992) although green taxes are 












Conservation has usually not been achieved through heavy-handed legislation. which 
often violates private property rights (Farrier, 1995; Wu & Babock, 1999; Michael, 
2003). In some instances regulation has proved to be a disincentive for conservation 
because regulations are often ineffective, unaffordable, frustrate and anger landholders 
and result in less public good conservation (McDowelL 1988; Turpie et ai., 2003a; 
Doremus, 2003; Causley, 2001; Polasky & Doremus, 1998; Michael, 2003, Parkhurst et 
al.,2002). 
r ncentives for agriculture such as encouraging land clearing in tropical forests are 
perverse incentives for conservation. Many tax incentives have been perverse, 
encouraging landholders to develop rather than to conserve indigenous vegetation 
(Binning & Young, 2003; McDowell, 1988). Perverse incentives for conservation such as 
taxing protected areas and forest clearing have, in recent years, in many cases been 
removed. 
Conservation incentives are well described and include; financial incentives (subsidies, 
direct payments or tax relief), development incentives (tradable or transferable 
development rights), property right mechanisms (easements and revolving funds), 
motivational incentives (education, local awards, community recognition, technical 
support, materials, juridical protection against land invasions), framework incentives 
(institution building and stakeholder involvement) and a host of other supporting 
mechanism such as water subsidies in arid environments (Botha 2001; Michael, 2003; 
Shogren et at., 2003; Swift et al., 2003; Langholz 1999; Bateson, 2001; OECD, 2004) or 
relaxation of other regulations for property owners who protect biodiversity (Doremus, 
2003). 
However although many different conservation incentives are proposed they could all be 
described as either economic or motivational conservation incentives. Economic 
incentives are any form of direct or indirect payment such as subsidies, tax relief, labour 
costs or any mechanism which could be reduced to cost. Economie conservation 
ineentives are commonly financial mechanisms to encourage private landowners to enter 











Motivational conservation incentives are all non-financial measures that influence the 
way that people think and act towards conservation, such as public recognition, juridical 
protection, information, institution building or the prospect of belonging to a group or 
scheme. 
Incentive based conservation IS under-utilised and inefficiency has resulted from 
'insufficient promotion and sporadic delivery of incentives by government' (Langholz et 
al, 2000). The literature describes numerous incentive projects and it would seem that 
private land conservation is best achieved when a mix of incentives (Bateson, 2001) or 
set of mechanisms in combination with other conservation measures are used 
(Crosthwaite, 2000). Few discuss which incentives are most effective (Michael, 2003) or 
what mix of incentives are best delivered (McKee et al.. 2005). 
2.2 Incentives in the global context 
Farming in the European Union (EU) is subsidized by farm price support and 
compensation schemes with a well established Agri-Environmental Policy (AEP) 
bringing acres of land under conservation (Morris & Potter, 1995). The common 
agricultural policy (CAP) accounts for about 50% of the total EU budget (around EUR 40 
billion), and although the EU receives a small and declining contribution to GOP from 
farming (European Environmental Agency, 2002), the EU contributes over $2.7 billion to 
European farmers (Green et al., 2005). 
In the United States of America over sixty percent of land is privately owned. 
Conservation easements, now offered in fifty states, have been adopted as the basic legal 
land conservation tool (Swift et at., 2003; Shogren et al .. 2003). Voluntary conservation 
agreements have doubled in the past decade (Shogren et at., 2003) and are becoming 
increasingly important in implementing the contentious Endangered Species Act, which 
initially failed to protect endangered species (Brook et at., 2003; Langpap & Wu, 2004). 











the highest conservation value' and an attempt needs to be made to ensure 'that 
landowners with the lowest opportunity costs own the most ecologically valuable 
property' (Michael, 2003). Conservation incentives are usually in the form of some type 
of direct payment or tax relief, but include education and technical support (Shogren et 
ai., 2003). An extra bonus, an agglomeration bonus (Parkhurst et al., 2002) has been 
proposed for land retired adjacent to any other retired land to encourage one 'contiguous 
area' (Shogren et ai., 2003). The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 and 
the newly created Conservation Security Program (CSP) has changed US environmental 
policy from providing incentives to retire agricultural land, to paying producers to adopt 
and maintain good conservation practice. US$ 17 billion has been budgeted for incentives 
for conservation on agricultural lands over five years (Parkhurst et aI., 2002; Shogren et 
a!., 2003; USDA, 2003; Kurkalova et ai., 2003). In both America and Europe much of 
conservation appears to be a question of financial compensation and considering the huge 
subsidies given for agriculture, it is in some respects probably cheaper to compensate 
conservation than to subsidise agriculture. 
Australia recognised the importance of private land conservation (Hale and Lamb, 1997) 
and has been instrumental in developing incentives for private land conservation such as 
the tax incentive (Binning & Young, 2003). The role that local governments can play in 
facilitating community involvement in conservation has been well recognised and 
municipalities have introduced incentive schemes providing both financial and non 
financial incentives (Bateson, 200 I; Binning & Young, \999). Australia has a huge body 
of farmers who have expressed dissatisfaction that 'farmers should be compensated if 
their ability to farm is compromised with legislation in the public interest' (NFF 
Australia, 2005). Private landholders have reservations about conservation easements 
(Kabii, 2003) and this contributed to initial poor participation in conservation schemes 
(James, 2002). Conservation schemes have become increasingly popular with landholders 
who enter into voluntary conservation agreements since tax incent.ives are in existence 
(Kemp, 2003). The Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act (1999) 
relies on self-regulation with heavy penalties for actions that significantly negatively 











Most countries in Latin America have more than 80% of their land in private ownership 
but this conservation is hampered by lack of institutional capacity and adequate legal 
tools (Swift et al., 2003). No Latin American countries have a national law authorizing 
conservation easements (Swift et al., 2003). A perverse conservation incentive has been 
that tenancy laws have required landowners to make adequate socio-economic use of 
their land or to face expropriation or invasion and although these laws have been 
repealed, perceptions about land use are tainted (Swift et al., 2003). Increasing the 
juridical security of land to protect private owners from having their land taken has been 
limited to Costa Rica, but this could potentially be a major incentive offered by 
governments (Swift et al., 2003) and particularly in countries where land invasions are 
prevalent. Costa Rica has promoted the best system of incentives for private land 
conservation offering significant economic incentives through property tax exemptions 
and a successful financial incentives program with payments for environmental services 
of approximately $50 per hectare per year (Langholz, 1999; Swift et al.. 2003). The only 
other country to offer economic incentives for private landowners is Brazil which has 
strong laws for private ownership but these are rarely enforced (Swift et ai., 2003). 
Property tax exemptions have been withdrawn from Ecuador, Guatemala, and Bolivia, 
due to the current financial crisis and given the limited budgets of most Latin American 
countries, 'the future of economic and tax incentives to promote private land conservation 
is not promising.' (Swift et at., 2003). Property tax exemptions on official. conserved 
private land may be offered but 'rural property taxes are traditionally very low and the tax 
collection systems are weak, this form of incentive has not been highly attractive to 
private landowners.' (Swift et at., 2003). 
Eco-Iabelling is an international conservation initiative and is a voluntary method of 
environmental performance certification. Eco-Iabelling creates a market-driven approach 
to achieve environmental goals by providing environmental information and enabling 
consumers to choose those products that have less impact on the environment (Clark & 
Downes, 1995; Grote, 2002). In South Africa certain eco-Iabelling has been successful 
such as badger-friendly honey. There is an increased effort to use eco-labelling both 
locally and internationally such as the Integrated Production of Wine Conformance 











increasingly willing to pay a premium on produce produced by environmentally sensitive 
initiatives (Donald, 2004) but support for such products is more difficult to initiate in 
developing countries where most consumers are less affluent. 
2.3 Incentives in the local context 
Part of this study was formulated around the need to understand the extent to which 
incentives, and particularly a property rate rebate, could influence private landowners to 
conserve the renosterveld on their farms. Although incentive policies for conservation on 
private land are probably the most cost-effective approach to achieve the CFR 
conservation targets (Gelderblom et aI., 2003; Pence et aI., 2003; Frazee et al., 2003), 
incentives are limited and few exist. A Stewardship Program was developed by Cape 
Nature Conservation and the Botanical Society of South Africa to promote private sector 
involvement in biodiversity conservation, whereby land of conservation value is 
committed into one of three contract options offering differing levels of assistance and 
incentives. The contracts distinguish between; a conservation area such as a conservancy; 
a negotiated legal co-operation agreement (easement or covenant); and a contract nature 
reserve, which binds the land in perpetuity, but allows the owner to retain the title of the 
land. Contracts can offer some incentives such as limited alien clearing subsidies 
(Heydenrych et ai., 1999; Botha, 2001; Pence et al .. 2003) but as yet farmers making a 
conservation effort are not offered tax concessions, fuel rebates or other benefits (Milton 
et al.. 2003). 
Delivering public policy via tax measures is complex (Chudleigh & Simpson, 2000) but 
the strength of a tax program is it's 'accessibility and capacity to reinforce the 
motivations oflandholders to privately invest in public goods' (Binning & Young, 2003). 
Tax incentives are easier to administer and at an effectively smaller cost to government 
when compared to other conservation incentives (Pence et aI., 2003; Binning, 2000; 
Chudleigh & Simpson, 2000). The tax system in South Africa is under utilised as such a 
mechanism (Botha, 2002) but tax exemptions for donations to conservation are being 











In investigating property tax as a conservation incentive in South Africa one needs to 
understand The Property Rates Act which provides the legal capacity for local 
governments to reduce or abolish property taxes on lands that have complied with certain 
regulations or been secured in perpetuity for conservation. Each municipality can 
stipulate their own rates policy with differential rate levies, but the legislation leaves this 
detail to the municipality because situations vary in different parts of the country (P van 
Ryneveld, rates consultant, pers. comm.). This potentially enables rebates or exemptions 
for preservation of renosterveld. 
The City of Cape Town (CCT) adopted an 80% rates exemption for all agricultural 
properties in rural areas (CCT Draft Rates Rebate Scheme, 2002). Bitou Municipality, by 
way of example, offers, on written application, a 90% rebate on assessment rates to 
agricultural zoned land if they have complied with National Veld and Forest Fire 
Act, 1993 and the Conservation of Agricultural Resources Act, Act 43 of 1983 (CARA) (M 
Botha, pers. comm.). This provides an incentive for Bitou private landowners to control 
invasive aliens and prepare fire breaks and this creative rates policy differs from that in 
the CCT where conservation land with unrestricted land use is not yet considered for rate 
rebates. The CCT as yet does not give rate rebates for conservation even if the land is 
secured in perpetuity and virgin land that is not zoned for agriculture is subject to full 
property rates taxation. This is a perverse conservation incentive as it discourages 
conservation by exempting agricultural land that has been developed while taxing pristine 
conserved land that is undeveloped. 
'Conservation oriented landowners are the greatest asset to protecting nature on private 
lands, and effective policy needs to maximize the value of this scarce resource' (Michael 
2003). Internationally motivational and economic incentives are on offer for private land 
conservation, with an increasing number of voluntary easements. In South Africa, 
property tax is a viable conservation incentive and should be developed together with 











3. CHAPTER 3: A REVIEW OF CURRENT POLICIES AND LEGISLATION 
RELEVANT TO THE CONSERVATION OF RENOSTERVELD 
3.1 Introduction 
Land conservation is ultimately influenced by financial and politically based decisions 
(Newburn et aI., 2005). This chapter aims to address the key questions, specifically 
"whether a property rate is a viable conservation incentive?" In order to determine 
whether current legislation could influence renosterveld conservation, the possibilities of 
a rate rebate as a conservation incentive are explored. Policies relating to land use 
planning, invasive aliens and the Local Government Property Rates Act [No 6 of 20041 
are discussed but with a focus on the Western Cape and more specifically the Cape 
Metropolitan Area (CMA). 
South Africa is a signatory to a number of international agreements and conventions 
promoting sustainable resource use and management. The 1992 UN Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro, brought environmental 
issues into focus with adoption of Agenda 21 promoting sustainable development. 
The White Paper of the Conservation and Sustainable Use of South .1frica's Biological 
Diversity (1997) supported the introduction of conditions and incentives (e.g. tax relief) 
to strengthen the involvement of the private sector in the conservation and sustainable use 
of biodiversity. The recommendations of the White Paper culminated in National 
Environmental l'1.1anagement Act (NEl'v/A) , [Act 107 of 1998/. which focuses on 
environmental management and promotes a national environmental interest "by laying 
down the institutional structures and legal mechanisms to champion the environmental 
cause" (Glazewski, 2005). NEltfA (Chapter 6) stipulates South Africa's environmental 
obligations in the broader international context (Glazewski, 2005). The National 
Environmental Management Biodiversity Act (2003) within the framework of NEAfA, has 











promotion of the sustainable use, conservation and appreciation relating to the rich 
biodiversity of South Africa for the benefit of all people. 
In South Africa, the more than 200 environmental laws and regulations enforced by 
numerous different government agencies, mainly at provincial level, have meant a 
plethora of fragmented legislation (Barnard, 2002). Difficulties with complying with 
Section 24 of the Constitution promoting conservation has resulted (Gelderblom et aI., 
2003) and environmental issues have persisted due to lack of implementation of 
environmental laws and regulations (Glazewski, 2005). It is essential that biodiversity 
conservation is part of state planning policy and that 'implementing organisations and 
other inheritor stakeholders' must be effectively considered during planning process if 
effective conservation goals are to be achieved (Pierce et aI., 2005). 
3.2 Land-use planning 
As one of the major causes of biodiversity loss is habitat degradation, sound land-use 
planning is of vital importance as many environmental concerns arise from decisions 
around land use. Paterson (2005) describes land-use planning legislation being bound by 
three mechanisms; national and provincial laws prescribing land-use planning, laws for 
the establishment of protected areas and laws to ensure environmental impact assessment 
before development. There is legislation in place that should restrain further development 
of renosterveld namely; The Environment Conservation Act 73 of 1989 (ECA) which 
controls environmentally unsound land-use change and CARA which provides legislation 
for the protection of natural vegetation; the cultivation of virgin land being subject to 
prior approval. Although NEMA promotes a national biodiversity interest, the National 
Department of Agriculture had never turned downed an application to cultivate virgin soil 
in the Western Cape Province, over-ruling the Provincial agricultural decisions by 
provincial-level agricultural authorities (CAPE conference participant, 2004) and many 
lands have been ploughed without permits. Tn reality legislation was rarely enforced due 
to lack of capacity in local government and the involvement of all spheres of government 











Many cities in South Africa have developed their own strategies for conservation. The 
CMA includes areas of renosterveld which are therefore influenced by policies relating to 
the City of Cape Town. The proposed Rural Management F'ramelvork for the City of 
Cape Town. (2002). recognised the threat of rapid urbanisation and loss of indigenous 
vegetation and regarded the facilitation of conservation practices by private landowners 
as a key environmental management issue. Land use planning ensures that land is put to 
optimal use, taking into account the different effects that land-uses can have in relation to 
social, political, economic and environmental concerns (Wise Land Use, 2001). The 
definition of a strong urban edge, defining the outer limit to urban development in the 
CMA is needed, and although the City of Cape Town Urban Edge Structure Plan was 
approved as policy in 2001, it has not to date been adopted by the CCT (S. Nicks, C~dV 
Africa,pers. comm.). 
Local zoning plans are a critical tool for private land conservation (Newburn et al.. 2005) 
and the use of land is controlled by a Zoning scheme. Every property is assigned a Use 
Zone in accordance with the Land Use Ordinance, No 15 of 1985. The Constitution and 
Municipal Structures Act, (No. 117 of 1998), make plan-making and land use applications 
the responsibility of the local municipality (Wise Land Use, 2001). Legislation around 
land development has changed because it used to require permission from different 
authorities which in some instances led to 'costly duplication, institutional contlict and a 
confused public' (Wise Land Use, 200 I). In the CCT land use permission is now required 
from one single municipal structure and an Integrated Zoning Scheme is currently being 
compiled (S. Nicks, pers. comm.). 
In South Africa land-use planning policy is determined by the Provincial Spatial 
Development Framework (PSDF) which essentially demonstrates how that province 
should develop. The Western Cape Department of Environmental Affairs, Economic 
Development and Development Planning is in the final stage of adopting the PSDF which 
has the protection of biodiversity and agricultural resources as one of the nine principles. 
Legislation now requires each municipality to adopt an Integrated Development Plan 
(lOP) to provide the strategies, projects and budgets for the municipality for that year 











the local government Spatial Development Framework (SDF). One of the aims of the 
PSDF is to provide the guidelines to inform and direct land use management and this 
occurs through the zoning schemes for which the local municipality is responsible, in 
both rural and urban areas (Western Cape Draft PSDF, July 2005). Provincial Spatial 
Development Frameworks should be aligned with the IDPs and budgets. 
The implications for conservation are that municipalities, guided by the PSOFs and lOPs 
will ultimately have the legislative l ability to place biodiversity conservation strongly on 
their agenda with sound zonation schemes which veto development of farm land on urban 
fringes and other environmentally insensitive developments. 
The implementation of the PSDF and the IDP budgets require a strong political support 
but a real potential exists for local governments to be assisted in the lOP process and 
thereby encouraged to incorporate good conservation planning into their IDPs. This 
process has been initiated in the Subtropical Thicket Biome, whereby local governments 
are given maps and guidelines to assist them in environmentally sustainable decisions 
(Pierce et at.. 2005). 
Farms with good agricultural potential have theoretically been placed in green belt areas 
to ensure that they are only sold as viable agricultural units but nevertheless have a huge 
potential for commercial development. Evidence of corrupt interference in land-use 
decisions in the past, by provincial or national departments, has led some farmers on the 
urban fringes to believe that their agricultural land could potentially sell for commercial 
use, in spite of legislated agricultural zoning schemes. These factors influence the way in 
which private landowners around the urban fringe perceive the potential commercial land 
value of their renosterveld fragments. Irregularities (such as ploughing of renosterveld 
without permission) exist to avoid legislative complications in the process of land 
rezoning and although it is illegal to plough or develop virgin land, legislation has not yet 
proved a deterrent. 











3.3 Invasive aliens 
CARA (amended, 2001) provides a statutory obligation for landowners to keep their land 
free of invasive alien plants, while NEMA aims to prevent, manage, control and eradicate 
alien and invasive species. Landowners are bound by the National Veld and Forest Fire 
Act 1998, Act 101 and have a duty to prepare and maintain fire breaks, to provide 
equipment and have available personnel to fight fires. 
The economic consequences of alien vegetation infestation are vast (Van Wilgen et aI., 
2002) and many private landowners have little or no incentives to clear their alien 
vegetation. Regulatory mechanisms could bankrupt landowners who are simply unable to 
afford the costs of alien clearing (Pence et aI., 2003) and this could act as a perverse 
incentive to farmers to plough alien-invaded land (Turpie & Heydenrych 2000). 
3.4 Property rates 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,1996 (s229) guarantees 'rates on 
property' as a source of revenue for local government. The Katz Commission of Inquiry 
recommended that a national land tax should not be implemented but rather a rural land 
tax 'in the local sphere' that finances local government (Katz, 1998). Government policy 
and legislation have defined municipalities as the primary point of delivery. 
The CCT has 422 registered farms with a total land value of R804,355,280 and property 
rates levied on these farm properties are R 11,367,149 (CCT Draft Rates Rebate Scheme, 
2002). Property rates contributed to about 23.82% of the income of the CCT 2003/2004 
operating budget but 17.2% of the 2004/2005 budget (City of Cape Town Annual Report, 
2003/2004). 
The Property Rates Act [No 6 of 2004} states that the amount due for rates is determined 
by the improved value of the property and the local government rates policy. No 
municipality may grant relief in respect of payment of a rate other than by way of an 











lowering of the amount for which the property was valued). The rates of farm properties 
used for 'agricultural purpose' may be rebated, reduced or exempt but this excludes the 
use of property for eco-tourism, game-trading and game-hunting. This del inking of 
ecotourism and agriculture could be problematic (R. Franzsen, in litt.) because 
renosterveld on farms that use their renosterveld for eco-tourism purposes could 
potentially be excluded from potential conservation incentives offered to farmers. 
Private land contractually bound into a national or provincial protected area, in 
contradiction of the NElvJA. initially received no exemption from municipal property rate 
taxes, but this has now been amended. The Property Rates Act (2004) 17(1) now states 
under other impermissible rates that a municipality may not levy a rate on e) those parts 
of a special nature reserve, national park or nature reserve within the meaning of 
Protected Areas Act, or of a national botanical garden within the meaning of the 
National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act, 2004, which are not developed 
or used for commercial, business, agricultural or residential purpose '. Land placed into 
protected areas may not be levied and provides the opportunity for private land owners 
who choose to cede their conservation worthy land into protected areas, to be exempt 
from those rates. However, the special nature reserve status may be withdrawn if the 
private landowners decides to withdraw or the state decides to withdraw because of a 
breach of agreement by the private landowner and the owner is then liable for rates in 
arrears (Property Rates Act, 2004). 
There is provision for the Minister of Finance to set a maximum rate for agriculture in 
relation to residential property (P van Ryneveld. pel's. comm.) and cognizance needs to be 
taken of the fact that over-taxing agricultural land may disturb the viability balance of 
farms (I Palmer, Palmer Development,pers. comm.). However there is provision for this 
in the act which states that '(4) When considering the criteria to be applied in respect of 
any exemptions, rebates and reductions on properties used for agricultural purposes, a 
municipality must take into account- ... (b) the contribution of agriculture to the local 
economy;(c) the extent to which agriculture assists in meeting the service delivery and (d) 
the contribution of agriculture to the social and economic we(fare of farms'. Most 











reduces the threat of crippling property taxes, but also reduces the potential financial 
reward for conservation incentives. A rate rebate would be a small price to pay for 
conservation, but local authorities may not be able to bear the costs given other social 
needs which have a greater priority (Milton el al., 2003; Frazee et aI., 2003). 
In conclusion this chapter has established that current policies and legislation could 
influence the sound protection of renosterveld and that a property rate is a viable 
conservation incentive. Although an opportunity exists for local government to provide 
incentives to private land-owners for conservation, compliance from both legislators and 











4. CHAPTER 4: METHODS 
In answering the key questions, fifty eight private landowners were interviewed, the 
results of which provided both qualitative and quantitative data. In order to select a 
sample of appropriate private landowners, a study area was established, farms with 
renosterveld were identified and appropriate private landowners approached. 
4.1 Study area 
This study focuses on renosterveld on private farmlands within the Cape Metropolitan 
Area (CMA) and three conservancies (countryside set aside in a negotiated legal co-
operation agreement between private land owners) outside the CMA There are 6433 
hectares of renosterveld in the CMA and the rationale for selecting this area is because 
renosterveld is highly threatened due to agricultural expansion and rapidly expanding 
urban development. 
The restructuring of the CMA meant that the (City of Cape Town) CCT was expanded to 
incorporate six previous municipalities but the exact boundary of the CMA was unclear. 
The CCT urban edge is now defined but has not yet been adopted by the City (Urban 
Edge Report, 2004). Three conservancies included in the study were the Bottelary IIi lis, 
the Renosterveld and Agtergroenberg Conservancies. Bottelary Hills Conservancy was 
initially part of the CCT but is now excluded. This exclusion meant that there were no 
conservancies within the boundaries of the CMA It was felt thought that the views of 
landowners in existing conservancies are important and for this reason landowners from 

















Figure 1: Maps of South Africa showing a) the original extent of renosterveld and 
b) the present total remaining area (Krug, 2004a). The dark green 
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Figure 2: Map showing the existing renosterveld in the Cape Metropolitan Area and the 












4.2 Identifying farms with renosterveld 
In order to ascertain which landholders to interview, properties on which renosterveld 
fragments occur needed to be identified, as well as the landowners and their contact 
details. 
In order to establish which private landowners have renosterveld on their farms a 
complex file of registered farms as per the Land Surveyors report was obtained from the 
CCT. The Land Surveyors farm number (the cadastral number) and sometimes the farm 
name were determined from these records. The Deeds Office data base (National Register 
of Property Transactions in Cape Town) was accessed in the hope of obtaining the 
current farm name and current landowner, using the cadastral number from the Land 
Surveyors report. However the Deeds Office data base has no link to the cadastral 
number except through a 21 digit code that was not readily available. The implications 
were that as the cadastral number was the source of reference to farms (Land Surveyors 
report), the current landowners' name and current farm name were not accessible from 
the Deeds Office data and this data source was therefore not utilised. 
Farms with renosterveld were then identified with the aid of Geographic Information 
System (GIS) data which provided the spatial data on the renosterveld. The following 
GIS data were used. 
1. GIS biodiversity remnant data, where the shape file for 'CAPE remnants' was 
identified as renosterveld, supplied by the CCT, Dept. of Environment. 
2. GIS cadastral numbers used to identify farms, supplied by the Land Surveyors 
General Office but obtained from the CCT, Dept. of Environment. 
3. GIS 1 :50 000 map of the Western Cape, compiled by The Chief Directorate: 











4. GIS lowlands renosterveld data which provided renostcrveld GIS for areas outside 
the CMA where 'CAPE remnants' and some 'natural vegetation' shape files were 
considered renosterveld, supplied by the Conservation Planning Unit, Botanical 
Society of South Africa. 
GIS renosterveld and cadastral data were transposed onto the GIS 1 :50000 Western Cape 
map. GIS renosterveld data for areas outside the CMA were then added. All GIS 
renosterveld data within the known cadastral numbers (farm number from the Land 
Surveyor General) was used to compile a complete list of renosterveld sites (Appendix 
8.2). This was then compared to the established list of registered farms. 
An initial attempt was made to use landowners to accurately ground-truth the 
renosterveld data on their farms. This was not pursued because landowners found the GIS 
map difficult to understand. Two GIS areas were inaccurate as the data omitted the 
renosterveld remnant on the Durbanville Race Course but depicted a large (899.3 ha) 
renosterveld remnant (labelled Radio 918) which is fragmented around the expanded 
town of KlipheuweJ. However, as neither of these remnants were on farms and therefore 
did not influence the selected study site, it is assumed that the GIS data used for this 
study were valid. This assumption is further supported by the fact that landowners' were 
able to accurately estimate the hectares of natural vegetation remaining on their farms and 
that these remnants were visible or shown to the researcher. 
The average fragment size in this study area is 134 ha, but excluding a large game farm 











4.3 Sampling Strategy 
4.3.1 Sampling 
All farms with renosterveld in the CMA were targeted. However, interviews ultimately 
depended on the ability to determine the renosterveld site and the contactability and 
availability of farmers. The study was then expanded to include a sample of land owners 
from three conservancies outside the CMA and more rural farmers. 
4.3.2 Establishing contact details of private landowners 
Farm owners and their contact details were established by contacting farmer associations 
and conservancy participants but chiefly by asking other farmers in the area. The criterion 
for identifying private landowners to interview was that landowners must have at least 
one fragment of renosterveld on their land. 
In the CMA, of the eighty seven renosterveld sites identified, ten sites are municipal and 
nine sites are either unidentified or the owner is unknown. Of these remaining sixty eight 
sites, some private landowners have more than one farm and some farms have more than 
one remnant of renosterveld, so only fifty four private landowners with renosterveld on 
their farms were ultimately identified. 
As there were potentially only fifty four landowners in the CMA, three conservancy areas 
outside the CMA were included; Agtergroenberg Conservancy, Bottelary Hills 
Conservancy and the Klapmuts Renosterveld Conservancy. The survey later included 
farmers from Malmesbury and Heidelberg in order to include some farmers perceived to 











4.4 Survey Methods 
4.4.1 Questionnaire survey 
Data were collected through a structured interview. The interview was guided by a 
questionnaire which was developed to record both qualitative and quantitative data. 
A questionnaire was developed and a pilot study initiated which involved interviewing 
five private land owners. The questionnaire was then redesigned and resulted in the tlnal 
questionnaire (Appendix 8.3) which was then translated into Afrikaans. Interviews in the 
form of this questionnaire were conducted at a pre-arranged time by the primary 
researcher, in the language preference and home/office of the informant. The interview 
was recorded manually, word for word where possible and in the language of the 
respondent. No recording equipment was used as it was thought to be intrusive. 
A total of eighty private landowners were contacted in the CMA, conservancies and more 
rural areas. Only fifty eight interviews were used in the final analysis, although sixty two 
private landowners were interviewed. Interviews with four fanners were not used; three 
interviews were discarded because virgin renosterveld no longer existed on those farms 
and one fanner interviewed became too paranoid to answer the questions. Four farmers 
refused interviews and sixteen private landowners were contacted or attempted to be 
contacted but not interviewed due to their being not available. 
Ultimately of the fifty eight interviews used, forty five farmers interviewed were from the 
CMA and the remaining thirteen were from rural areas and conservancies outside the 
CMA. 
4.4.2 Questionnaire structure 











1. Section A: Biographic data and nature of farming. 
i) Biographic data: farmer and farm details 
ii) Nature of farming: QI relates to the type of farming and Q2 asks how long 
the farm has been in the business or family. Although conservation 
practices have been known to correlate with various factors such as level 
of education, affluence, and language (McDowell, 1988; Winter, 2003), 
the researcher was not interested in exploring whether level of education, 
affluence or language could explain attitudes or behaviour as these factors 
were deemed inappropriate in an incentives program. 
2. Section B: Retaining natural vegetation. 
Closed questions were used to elicit a single answer. 
i) Q3 - 6 was set to investigate the area and nature of virgin land 
ii) Q7 - 8 explored the management of alien vegetation 
iii) Q9 - 15 requested the cost involved in conserving natural vegetation 
3. Section C: Incentives for saving indigenous vegetation. 
i) Q 16 was structured using a five point Likert scale and assessed the 
farmers perceptions regarding incentive measures and conservation 
ii) Q 17 asked farmers to rank fifteen potential incentives using a ranking 
scale (one to ten) with a score of ten being a good incentive 
SPSS statistics is a software package used to gain greater insight into the actions, 
attributes, and attitudes of people. In order to measure the fanner' attitudes to 











Likert Scale for SPSS software analysis. However an SPSS analysis was not used 
because the researcher felt that when the questions were grouped together they did 
not accurately portray the farmers' perceptions. The data were therefore analysed 
by grouping the Likert scores into 'agreed' or 'disagreed' or 'did not know' and 
calculated as percentages. 
4. Section D: Motivation to conserve renosterveld. 
Seven questions were designed using Appreciative Inquiry questions and analysed 
using Grounded Theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). This analysis was first 
conducted on the qualitative data transcribed from the interviews of nineteen 
fanners and was subsequently repeated and improved using the transcribed 
qualitative data from the fifty eight land owners. 
The interview questions (Appendix 8.3) were based on The Appreciative Inquiry 
Method (Cooperrider & Srivastva, 1987) which does not focus or inquire about 
problems but focuses on what is appreciated. Appreciative Inquiry searches for 
and accentuates the positive. This method was chosen as in the absence of any 
current incentives, it must be positive factors that motivate fanners to conserve. 
These appreciative inquiry questions were designed to elicit and explore stories 
because it is ultimately stories that are able to inspire and from which constructive 
action can be taken (Liz Mellish, Liz Mellish & Associates, pers. comm.). 
Although this method was chosen to elicit positive responses the questions were 
sufficiently open ended to enable farmers to be critical and express dissatisfaction 
where appropriate. 
4.5 Analysis 











4.5.1 Analysis of quantitative data: 
The quantitative data items from the questionnaire were collated and analysed. EXCEL 
produced charts that compared the contribution of each value to the total or to the values 
across categories. EXCEL was used to determine the Net Present Values (NPV) and 
Internal Rates of Return (IRR). ST A TISTICA 7 used the Kruskal- Wallis ANOV A to 
determine the significant differences between incentives. 
All property valuations used were determined by using experienced property valuers as 
they provide sound estimates (Van Zyl, 2005). 
4.5.2 Analysis of qualitative data: 
The analysis of this research proved to be difficult, as a qualitative approach tends to be 
more subjective and is contrary to the more empirical approach of quantitative methods 
(Gibbs, 2002). The data were analysed using the Computer Assisted Qualitative Data 
Analysis software program QSR NVivo Versionl.2 142. The merits of computer assisted 
qualitative data analysis have been debated (McLard et aI., 2003; Lee & Fielding, 1996) 
but can be effective if the analytic procedures are transparent (de Wet & Erasmus, 2005). 
In qualitative analysis the data exists in expressions which need to be understood in 
context and 'seeks to take account of the views of those involved and the subjective and 
social constructs of their world' (Flick et aI., 2004). The concern is that renosterveld is a 
threatened eco-system which needs protection, but what would motivate private 
landowners to conserve it needs to be fully understood. Renosterveld grows on more 
fertile soils generally suitable for agriculture and although some farmers are not fully 
aware of its value or of the threats, renosterveld continues to decline. The legislation that 
protects it is ignored because the opportunity costs are too high and legislation is not 
enforced. The new South African government abolished subsidies, legislated labour and 
tenancy laws and farmers see themselves as 'scapegoats for apartheid' (Koelle & Oettle, 
2003). Land reform issues place additional pressure and insecurity and cause farmers to 











to farmers but is now non existent in parts, although farmers have good informal network 
systems. Farmers have not always collaborated with governmental conservation groups, 
although this is changing. 
I'he qualitative data were transcribed from interviews of fifty eight landowners and were 
analysed using grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, t 967). Grounded theory is usually 
associated with exploratory research and used extensively across social science 
disciplines (Gibbs, 2002). 'The grounded theory approach is a qualitative research 
method that uses a systematic set of procedures to develop an inductively derived 
grounded theory about a phenomenon.' (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Qualitative analysis 
using grounded theory involves two main procedures, namely coding and adjunctive 
procedures. Coding procedures include open coding, axial coding and selective coding 
and require questions to be asked and comparisons to be made, while adjunctive 
procedures are memos, general comments that are made while coding (Strauss & Corbin, 
1990). 
The focus of inquiry in the interview revolved around two issues, namely what farmers 
like about the renosterveld and how they suggest it is preserved, should they wish to. 
Private landowners were asked what they value about renosterveld but were not directly 
asked what motivates them to conserve as this would preconceive the emergence of data, 
rather than allowing the theory to inductively arise from the data. Conservation must be 
understood from the private landowners' perspective as it is not in their best financial 
interest to set aside land for conservation. 
The steps followed in the grounded theory were as follows: 
1. Familiarise data by close reading. 












3. Compare and link coded categories to form a core category from which the theory 
emerges. 
4. Reflect and assess the validity of the process. 
STEP 1 : Familiarise the data by close reading 
Qualitative data analysis begins with in depth reading of the interview and provides the 
forum for issues to 'arise' out of the data. 
STEP 2: Label the incidents (data) and categorize data segments to create relevant 
categories 
Grounded theory begins with coding and in the open coding process data were reread to 
bring together ideas about the data. Data segments were gathered, relevant information 
labelled, conceptualised and segments of the text were placed into 14 relevant node 
categories (Appendix 8.4). The data relevant to each category were scrutinized and 
examined for deeper connotations in a process kno\\>TI as the 'constant comparison 
method'. Categories should consider 'sociological constructs' and 'in vivo codes' 
(Glaser, 1992). Many older farmers understand the word 'conservation' to be 'soil 
erosion' and questions about conservation are answered in terms of contour banks and 
preventing erosion. 'Soil erosion' is therefore an in vivo code for 'conservation'. 
Categories are not exclusive and data segments can be attributed to several incidents or 
observations (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Ideas, thoughts, reasons, motivations should 
continually be recorded during this process in 'memos'. For example when annotating 
'neighbour relationships' one might memo that a farmer, who was part of a nature 
conservancy, refused to be interviewed because he did not care for conservation and 
claimed only to have joined the conservancy to please his neighbour. This memo may 











STEP 3 : Compare and link coded categories to form a core category from which the 
theory emerges. 
The analysis continued to axial coding where categories are fine tuned, revisited, clarified 
and compared and put back together in new ways after open coding (Fielding & Lee, 
1998). The relationships of categories were explored, finding connections between them 
and 'the idea is that each element in turn has a causal influence on the next' (Gibbs, 
2002). For example 'links with the past' influences the 'emotional connection', which in 
turn influences constructive attributes and so on and in this way themes should start 
emerging and concepts develop. 
The final stage of coding is selective coding which produces the core category around 
which all others are related (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). The themes from the final network 
of relationships between categories, determined the main claims of the resulting analysis 
and theory. 'l"his stage is mostly analytical and theoretical and is the process by which 'a 
fully grounded theory emerges' (Strauss & Corbin, 1990; Gibbs, 2002). 
STEP 4 : Reflexivity and assessment of validity 
This final step involved a further reassessment of the whole process of analysis. 
'Reflexivity' is in part 'consideration of the process of research and its possible 
implications for the validity of the main claims and conclusions of a study' (Hammersley 
& Atkinson, 1983) as there are always potential sources of error. 
The interviews were recorded in the researchers own hand. Although a tape-recorded 
interview may have provided more data through re-listening for nuances and emphases, a 
manual recording method was selected to provide a less threatening atmosphere. 
'Nodes are not merely a simple categorization of passages of the text' (Gibbs, 2002) and 
in this qualitative analysis the researcher thought the categories represented too many 
facts and not enough phrases that could indicate more psychological meaning. The 











found these more abstract categories difficult to create. Some farmers found the questions 
in the interviews difficult to answer and many answered 'nOll vra jy my vas' (that's 
difficult to answer). Questions were repeated using different synonyms and this enabled 
some farmers to eventually divulge their thoughts. Farmers are not usually asked why 
they conserve renosterveld and some answers became reiterations of what the interviewer 
had said earlier. Some data provided by statements such as 'get together and talk about it' 
were omitted because they did not fulfil a category. In grounded theory data that are not 
coded, are at some stage discarded and this is a recognised problem, because significant 
information is sometimes overlooked. 
The validity and reliability of qualitative research analysis will remain in debate because 
'the issue of whether the representations of the objects of qualitative research are valid 
cannot be escaped' (Gibbs, 2002). 
4.6 Limitations of the Study 
4.6.1 Sampling 
The purposive sampJ ing of farms with renosterveld fragments introduced a sampling bias. 
However, this was counteracted by the planned interviewing of all farmers with 
renosterveld in the CMA. 
Although attempts were made to interview all fifty four farmers with renosterveld in the 
CMA, only forty four were ultimately interviewed as the remaining ten were either not 
contactable or refused to be interviewed. The study site was thus expanded to include 
further private landowners outside the CMA in conservancies and more rural areas. 
No comparisons were made between farmers in the CMA, conservancies and more rural 
areas. A larger sample size (more farmers) would have enabled comparison. Sample size 











4.6.2 Financial data 
This research requires financial data and although confidentiality is offered, the tinancial 
data provided by the private landowner may not always be accurate and could impact on 
the results of the analysis. 
4.6.3 Recording/Language 
The fact that both English and Afrikaans are used may mean that data are lost in 
translation. An inherent bias exists when manually recording the interview because 
although the researcher attempts to record all that is said, some things are unwillingly 
excluded that may have been of importance. 
4.6.4 Inter-disciplinary research 
Conservationists have alluded to the necessity 'to legitimize and encourage disciplinary 
boundary crossings' (Orr, 1994). Interdisciplinary teaching has become more integrated 
over time (Niesenbaum et ai., 2003) and although mixing soeial science with natural 
science has been suggested, it has not often been pursued (Orr, 1994). In this research 
there was an attempt to investigate incentives from both science perspectives. Although 
qualitative data suggest subjective interpretation, this 'inductively derived' data lend 
richness to understanding the human perspective of motivation. The researcher struggled 
with amalgamating the qualitative and quantitative results into coherent theory and 











5. CHAPTER 5 : RESULTS 
5.1 Opportunity costs of maintaining renosterveJd 
In addressing the key question whether farmers will keep or transform these fragments, 
renosterveld is considered both in terms of the direct cost of conserving renosterveld and 
the foregone income or opportunity costs. 
5.1.1 Characteristics of renosterveld farms 
One of the characteristics of the farms in the CMA is that many farms have been in the 
family for generations and some of these farms have been in existence for over 300 years. 
Of the landowners interviewed 49% had farms that had been in their family for 51 years 
or longer, while 23% had family farms for 21 to 50 years. Only 9% of landowners had 
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Almost half the farms had vineyards as the main source of income (Figure 3); while grain 
and dairy were the major source of income for a third of the farmers, less than a quarter 
of the farmers had other main types offarming. As most farmers had vineyard as their 
main type of farming, a focus was given to issues surrounding wine farmers. 
5.1.2 The direct costs of maintaining renosterveld 
McDowell (1988) describes ecosystem conservation expenses as capital expenses and 
running expenses. Running expenses include fire management, alien clearing, fencing 
and security. The cost of maintaining renosterveld was documented in these categories 
and a further category added which included other expenses such as conservancy fees. 
These categories are presented as a percentage of the total cost (Figure 4). Alien 
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Figure 5: Landowners total cost of renosterveld (includes landowners with no costs 
(n=56)) 
The costs for renosterveld are presented again as total costs (Figure 5) and are discussed in 
their cost category. The results include all landowners as well those who have no costs in 
maintaining their renosterveld fragments, so the areas of renosterveld not incurring cost 
were used in estimating the rates per hectare. 
Security 
Security expenses were given as R19 ha- I y"1 (Figure 5). The cost of security is incurred on 
only 10% of the farms. Security costs tended to be measures to protect livestock in the 
renosterveld from theft, such as devices attached to sheep that alert the farmer when the 
sheep are on the move at night. These devices could be deemed to be the cost of keeping 
sheep and not the cost of security, but it is presumed that sheep in renosterveld pose as a 
higher security risk than sheep kept on more nutritious pastures closer to the homestead. 
Fire 
Farmers use fire to clear or prepare land but are reluctant to control burn. Burning 
requires permission and even control burning poses a risk. Summer fires in high winds 











totalling the annual estimated cost of fire management provided by each farmer and 
dividing this by the number of hectares of renosterveld on their farm. The mean value of 
the cost of fire management on all farms was calculated as R36 ha-1 i 1 (Figure 5). Fire 
management costs are largely proactive cost for fire breaks. 
Only 23% of the farmers provided fire management costs and severe fire costs are 
possibly only reflected when an infrequent fire occurs. The cost of a serious fire can be 
extremely high. Fire stations respond to calls (especially in urban areas) and charge a fee 
per incident type. An incident type increases depending on the severity of the fire (a 
house is incident type 1; a shop incident type 2; a major fire incident type 3). Costs 
are then doubled or tripled according to the incident type (Mr Bosch, Goodwood Central 
Fire Station, pers. comm.). A major fire appliance costs R198 per IS minutes (or part 
thereof). For example a major fire lasting two hours with 2 fire engines would cost 
R9504. 
Fencing 
Farmers wishing to conserve a remnant of renosterveld or establish a conservancy are 
faced with fencing costs which vary depending on the type of fencing required. Fencing 
costs were calculated by using the estimated annual cost of fencing provided by each 
farmer and dividing this by the number of hectares of renosterveld on their farm. Fencing 
is given as the second highest cost of maintaining renosterveld and the mean value of the 
cost of fencing was calculated as R85 ha-1 il. 
Farm fencing costs are estimated at R70 m-2 for low wire and R80 m-2 for high wire (1.8 -
2 m) (M. Willemse, WPK Malmesbury recommended fencer, pers. comm.). WPK 
Durbanville quoted R70-RIOO m-2 depending. Cost for stock fencing (7 strands of barbed 
wire at l.2m, with wooden straining, intermediate posts and steel droppers) is given at 
R29 m-2 (JJ Fencing, Blackheath, pers. comm.). Game fencing is generally more 
expensive than stock fencing and requires a minimum of 22 plain wires (R15 mol 












It is clear that alien clearing claims the bulk of the expenditure in maintaining a 
renosterveld fragment (Figure 4). Landowners gave alien clearing as their highest running 
cost for maintaining renosterveld (Figure 5). The given cost is R267 ha- I . 
The benefits private landowners derive from restoring the 'productive potential of 
indigenous vegetation' do not outweigh the costs of clearing which range from about 
R320 - R6 700 ha- I for lightly to densely infected areas of invasive acacias in lowland 
fynbos (Turpie & Heydenrych, 2000). 
The cost of alien clearing presented in this analysis is lower than the cost given by Turpie 
& Heydenrych (2000). However, only 37% of farmers claim to have any alien vegetation 
costs. The bulk of landowners (63%) have properties that are less than 10% infested or 
not infested (Figure 6) and only 4% of landowners claim to have land that is heavily 
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Figure 6: Landowners estimate of the extent to which their natural land is infested with 
alien vegetation 
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Figure 7: Landowners indication of current removal of alien vegetation (n=55) 
The majority of farmers (62%) are paying for their alien vegetation to be cleared. 29% of 
landowners do not clear their alien vegetation although some landowners claim not to 
have alien vegetation in their renosterveld (Figure 7) Landowners (4%) have funded 
removal and 5% have alien vegetation cleared by woodcutters. The bulk of clearing 












5.1.3 The economic potential of renosterveld fragments 
Land prices 
Land-use change is seen as one of the biggest threats to renosterveld, both in terms of 
agricultural expansion and urban development around the fringes of the CMA. The areas 
that might affect land-use change are explored. 
Developed agricultural land sells for more than undeveloped land set aside for 
conservation and these property prices have a major impact on natural environment issues 
(McDowell, 1988). The price of agricultural land in the Western Cape is influenced by 
climate, topography, production capability and other variables such as size, 
untransformed land and population density (Mcosano, 2005). There is a huge discrepancy 
in price range and properties close to town, in a perceived desired locality, can command 
disproportional prices from local and overseas buyers. 
The pnce of agricultural land in the CMA vanes considerably, rangmg from about 
R45 000 - RI 000 000 per hectare (Pam Golding, Agricultural consultants, pers. comm.). 
The estimates for agricultural potential vineyard land in the CMA are valued at R250 000 
- R450 000 per hectare. Developed agricultural land tends to accommodate the cost of 
developing that land, which is an estimated additional R 100 000 ha- I for irrigated 
vineyard (Pam Golding Agricultural consultants, pers. comm.). Large tracts of low 
potential land for grazing occurring mainly outside the CMA, may sell for an estimated 
R250 - R500 per hectare (H. van Niekerk, Land Bank,pers. comm.). 2 
Commercial land, residential land and agricultural land command different pnces. 
Agricultural land rezoned for commercial purposes commands prices of approximately 
R50 000 to Rl 000 000 per ha (Pam Golding Commercial consultants, pers. comm.) but 
2 Six estate agents were asked the average cost of agricultural land in the CMA. Based on their estimates, 
agricultural land prices vary from R 1000 000 ha· l for vineyard to R2 500 ha- l for more rural pastures. This 
discrepancy makes the cost of agricultural land difficult to estimate. The 'going rate' in the CMA is R45 











the best current estimate is about Rl 000000 ha- ' (A. Realty,pers. comm.). Commercial 
land fetches high prices in both high density and low density areas because although low 
density areas are more sought after, high density construction produces greater income. 
Generally agricultural land is estimated to be worth about half, or in some instances, one 
third the value of residential land. Agricultural land for vineyard around the CMA is 
R350000 ha-1 (mean value), and the value would therefore be estimated at R700 000 ~ 
R 1 050000 ha- 1, which approximates the estimates for commercial land. 
Existing revenue from renosterveld 
Only 19% (n=11) of the farmers interviewed received any remuneration from their 
renosterveld and their current income, ranged from R35 ha- I to R46 429 ha- I with a 
geometric mean of R235.98 ha-1 • The geometric mean was used because the results 
would have otherwise been skewed by a profitable commercial game lodge venture. The 
income provided by the landowners was gross income not net income and so the 
commercial game lodge venture does not reflect the initial costs of establishing this 
lodge. 
The main use of renosterveld, currently generating an income, is for grazing (n=5) but 
other uses include game and tourism (n=4), buchu (n=l) and wild flower harvesting 
(n= I). These data are presented as the mean actual income per hectare (Figure 11). This 
reflects the data supplied by landowners who had an income or estimated incomes and 
landowners who did not provide information were excluded. The game lodge and tourist 
ventures generated the largest income but the average income per hectare was reduced as 




























Figure 8: Existing revenues from areas of similar soils 
D 
grain 
The income from similar soils shows that vineyard is producing the highest gross income 
and grain the lowest (Figure 8). One amount of R15 833 ha- I y-I for dairy was given as 
income from similar soil types. This is unrealistic revenue from renosterveld because 
supplementary feeding can allow numerous cows on a small area (Farmers X, dairy 
farmer,pers. comm.). 
5.1.4 Landowner perceptions of potential income from renosterveld 
areas 
Landowners were asked what they thought was the best use for the renosterveld on their 
farm, other than its current use. Landowners provided estimates of potential income but 











Only 75% of landowners suggested another use and the remaining 25% thought that 
renosterveld had no other use or not one that they could use on their farms. The results 
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Figure 9: Landowners' suggested best use of the renosterveld on their farm (n=44) 
Eight one percent oflandowners receive no income from their renosterveld. All the 
landowners were asked to estimate what they thought would be the best use for their 
renosterveld, other than its current use. The majority of landowners (58%) thought 
agriculture would be the best use for their renosterveld, which included grazing, olives, 
vineyard and buchu (Figure 9). An equal proportion (36%) of landowners listed 
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Figure 10: Landowners' estimated gross income ha ·1 from the best use (other than the 
current use) of renosterveld on their farm (n=24) 
Landowners were reluctant to estimate income for the best use of renosterveld but 
perceive eeo-tourism as having the greatest opportunity cost. Landowners suggested that 
eco-tourism would be both the best use of renosterveld (Figure 9) and would produce the 
highest income (Figure 10) but only three landowners, all involved with eco-tourism, 
estimated an eco-tourism income. One of these landowners estimated he could mUltiply 
his current eco-tourism income by 10. The mean estimated gross income per hectare for 
eco-tourism was R7749 (Figure 10) and it is clear that ceo-tourism is perceived as 
profitable. Eco-tourism requires larger fragments of renosterveld3 and about half the 
fragments of renosterveld in this study area are on steep hills. 
Although grazing was suggested as the second highest best use (Figure 9), it was not 
perceived as generating much income (Figure 10). The income from farmers who are 
currently receiving income from grazing their renosterveld (n=5) is R199 ha ·1 y -I. 
After grazing, olives are perceived as the best use for renosterveld (Figure 9) but after eco-
tourism, olives were estimated as generating the next largest income (Figure 10) of R4246 
per hectare per annum. Buchu is not perceived as generating a good income although one 
3 Of 18 000 remaining fragments of renosterveld in the CFR more than half are less than one hectare (von 











farmer suggested an income of R20 000 per hectare per annum but it is suggested as the 
fifth best use for renosterveld. There are farmers who suggest vineyard as the best use 
(n=4) and this suggests that not all renosterveld is perceived to be on marginal ground. 
5.1.5 Estimated opportunity costs of maintaining renosterveld 
One of the perceptions of renosterveld is that it is only found steep hilltops or on land 
unsuitable for agriculture or 'uitvalgrond' (Winter, 2003), but there are opportunity costs 
because renosterveld does exist on some land that has the potential for further agricultural 
development. 
The opportunity cost is the major cost of protection and is a measure of the alternative 
income sacrificed in the alternative use of agricultural land (Mohr & Fourie, 1995; 
Sinden, 2004). Michael (2003) argues that opportunity costs are frequently calculated as 
'the lost revenue from restricting current land use, ignoring the fact that landowners may 
have non-commodity values for the land in its protected state'. Michael (2003) defines 
opportunity costs as 'the difference between the market values of the property in its 
restricted and unrestricted states'. 
Opportunity cost is essentially what is being lost by investing in conservation rather than 
development. There are overlaps between the economic potential and opportunity costs 
but in financial terms they are essentially different. 
The opportunity cost of renosterveld in the CMA and surrounds is explored in terms of 
income generated from the main types of farming namely; vineyard, wheat, olives, 
grazing, cattle and buchu. Eco-tourism is discussed. Three incomes from renosterveld are 
used to explore the viability of renosterveld. These incomes are the actual income, the 
perceived income generated from the suggested best use for renosterveld and the actual 
average opportunity costs (income from similar soils) of renosterveld. 
The net present value (NPV) is the difference between the present value of cash inflows 
and the present value of cash outflows and is a standard method for evaluating whether a 
proposed long-term investment is profitable. A project with a positive NPV should be 











same vineyard in the future, taking inflation and returns into account and indicates that a 
positive NPV is profitable. A higher discount rate can be used to assess the profitability 
of more risky projects. The Internal Rate of Return (lRR) is a measure used to determine 
the rate of return on investments (i.e. the interest rate that makes net present value of all 
cash flow equal zero). An investment with a higher IRR is therefore favoured. 














The net present value and internal rate of return for vineyard and superior 
quality vineyard 
VINEYARD SUPERIOR QUALITY VINEYARD 
Running Income Net Running Income Net 
Cost Expected Income Cost Expected Income 
67,776 ° -67,776 74,961 ° -74,961 14,966 0 -14,966 14,966 0 -14,966 
17,030 1,312 -15,718 17,030 32,500 15,470 
20,643 21,139 496 20,643 52,000 31,357 
20,643 26,424 5,781 20,643 65,000 44,357 
20,643 26,424 5,781 20,643 65,000 44,357 
20,643 26,424 5,781 20,643 65,000 44,357 
20,643 26,424 5,781 20,643 65,000 44,357 
20,643 26,424 5,781 20,643 65,000 44,357 
20,643 26,424 5,781 20,643 65,000 44,357 
244,273 180,995 -63,2 474,500 223,042 
Net Present Value at 5% -67,153 Net Present Value at 5% 139,420 
Net Present Value at 10% -68,257 Net Present Value at 10% 84,474 
Internal Rate of return -15.34% Internal Rate of return 26,77% 
A recent surge in the wine industry in South Africa has meant the development of a large 
number of vineyard plantings. The total area under wine grape vineyards (excluding 
sultanas) has increased 16 % over the past decade (1994-2004) but by 20% in 2005. The 
total hectares under wine grapes in 2004 was 100 207 hectares, which increased to 124 
749 hectares in 2005 (SA WIS statistics, 2005). This indicates a large increase (20%) in 











The average income per ton of grapes in 2004 was R2 126 (SA WIS statistics, 2005) and 
vineyards generally produce 10-13 tons of grapes per hectare (VinPro, 2006), but 
generally 10 tons is the estimate for superior quality grapes (M. Carmichael-Green, 
Winning Wines Consultancy, pers. comm.). This means that for each hectare of 
cultivatable renosterveld, the gross income is potentially an estimated R21 260 R27638 
per hectare and production costs are high (Table 1). These statistics includes inferior 
quality grapes from the more marginalised areas and is not a true reflection of income in 
the CMA and surrounds because good quality grapes fetch on average about R45 000 per 
hectare. 
The drivers of vineyard expansion are seen to be world consumption of wine and the US 
Dollar/SA Rand exchange rate (Fairbanks et aI., 2004). The wine market in the short term 
outlook indicates that the global industry is growing and WOSA's (Wines of South 
Africa) predict that 'South Africa's future gro\\-th is likely to be hampered by a lack of 
wine supply, most particularly in premium quality segments' (SA WIS, Production and 
Market Estimates 2004-2008). 
Predictions for the smaller wine producers who do not have premium grapes are not good 
(VinPro, 2006). Lower income grapes are estimated to be unprofitable (lRR -15.34%), 
while premium quality grapes estimates have a more favourable economic outlook (lRR= 











TABLE 2: The net present value and internal rate of return for olives and wheat 
OLIVES WHEAT 
YEAR Running Income Net Running Income Net 
Cost Expected Income Cost Expected Income 
YEAR 1 28,694 0 -28.694 2,700 1,584 -1,116 
YEAR 2 3,212 0 -3,212 2,700 1,584 -1,116 
YEAR 3 3,212 0 -3,212 2,700 1,584 -1,116 
YEAR 4 5,662 4,000 -1,662 2,700 1,584 -1,116 
YEAR 5 7,162 8,000 838 2,700 1,584 -1,116 
YEAR 6 8,662 12,000 3338 2,700 1,584 -1,116 
YEAR 7 11,062 16,000 4938 2,700 1,584 -1,116 
YEAR 8 14,062 24,000 9938 2,700 1,584 -1,116 
YEAR 9 15,562 28,000 12,438 2,700 1,584 -1,116 
YEAR 10 17,062 32,000 14,938 2,700 1,584 -1,116 
TOTAL 114,352 124,000 9,648 27,000 15,840 -11,160 
Net Present Value at 5% -3,811 Net Present Value at 5% -8,617 
Net Present Value at 10% -11,680 Net Present Value at 10% -6,857 
Internal Rate of return 3.29% 
Wheat 
The Malmesbury district has suffered a severe drought over the past two years with the 
average yield ha -1 at 2.6 tons and an average price R I 200 ton -I in 2002-2005 (A Fourie, 
Grain SA pers. comm.). The price per ton in the Swartland increased to R 1035.14 ton -I 
in 2005, but the yields were lower at 1.53 tons ha -1. These yields are not a true reflection 
of wheat production in the Swart land as some farmers 'saai dam ,4. Costs for this type of 
wheat production are low and yields are very low but a bumper year produces good long 
term profitability (S. Stein, Malmesbury farmer, pers. comm.). Wheat is unprofitable 
with a Net Present Value (NPV) at 10% = - R 6857 (Table 2) with no returns. 
Olives 
The gross income per hectare of olives varies according to different topography, olive 
tree varieties etc. Olives can be planted on slopes where vineyard cultivation could be 
4 'Saai dam ': the practice of planting wheat in rnarginallow lying land and involves the diverting of river 











more difficult and rumours abound with returns of R57 000 ha -1 being claimed, but the 
estimated IRR = 3.29% (Table 2). The claim that there are good perceived profits from 
olives is probably based on income from the marketing of olives rather than the 
production of olives. 
Grazing cattle 
Dairy is not considered as an opportunity cost of renosterveld because dairy cows can be 
kept on small lots. The carrying capacity of beef varies considerably but an estimate for 
renosterveld was given as 10 cows ha -1 at an income of @R3.80 per day per cow. 
Renosterveld has only 3 months of grazing available annually and gross income would 















The net present value and internal rate of return for buchu and for buchu with a fire 
after five years 
BUCHU BUCHU POST FIRE 
Running Income Net Running Income Net 
Cost Expected Income Cost Expected Income 
47,420 0 -47,420 47,420 0 -47,420 
8,420 0 -8,420 8,420 0 -8,420 
15,020 75,000 59,980 15,020 75,000 59,980 
15,070 125,000 109,930 15,070 125,000 109,930 
14,970 200,000 185,030 14,970 200,000 185,030 
15,120 250,000 234,880 47,420 0 -47,420 
15.120 300,000 284,880 8,420 0 -8,420 
15,120 350,000 334,880 15,020 75,000 59,980 
15,120 350,000 334,880 15,070 125,000 109,930 
15,120 350,000 334,880 14,970 200,000 185,030 
176,500 2,000,000 1,823,500 201,800 800,000 598,200 
Net Present Value at 5% 1,260,273 Net Present Value at 5% 418,111 
Net Present Value at 10% 891,097 Net Present Value at 10% 299,820 
Internal Rate of return 105.12% Internal Rate of return 83.40% 
Cowling & Richardson (1995) estimated buchu income as R 18 000 - 25 000 ha- I and an 











(Table 3). The unbelievable present price ha- 1 (JRR= 105.12%) is because there is a huge 
demand, especially in European markets, where buchu is used as a flavour enhancer. 
Buchu does best on well drained sandy soils, especially stony soils with alluvial deposits 
and low phosphate and there are pockets of such soils suitable for buchu production in 
renosterveld. The actual area of such soils suitable for buchu is not known. Even if the 
price is halved buchu is well worth planting (A Harris, buchu nurseryman and fanner, 
pers. comm .. ) and even if buchu is destroyed by fire after 5 years the outcome IS 
favourable (JRR= 83.40%). These are incredibly good rates of return (Table 3). 
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Figure 11: Gross income from actual, current and perceived income of renosterveld 
The actual income, the current income and the estimated income of landowners (Figure 











mcome of renosterveld. The landowners estimated (perceived) income which might 
intuitively be based on what is possible on similar soils is lower than the actual income. 
The actual income is generally much lower than the income from similar soils, except 
rarely, as in eco-tourism lodge for example. It is unlikely that the eco-tourism lodge 
would be viably replicated. The opportunity costs are not that high unless areas are 
rezoned for commercial use. 
Eco-tourism 
The opportunity cost of eco-tourism is not estimated in this analysis because firstly 
estimating the cost of tourism is complicated when the initial costs vary considerably 
according to the type of tourist venture pursued and secondly because tourism is not 
generally seen as a threat to renosterveld, as it conserves rather than develops 
renosterveld. However, tourist chalets located in a patch of renosterveld which require a 
'no burn' policy may have a negative impact. Developing small game eeo-tourism 
ventures is expensive and on average even the most successful game ranch requires at 
least R6 in capital outlay for every R I generated annually, taking about 6 to 10 years for 
a small ranch to reach its economic carrying capacity when starting with minimum 
breeding herds. (WildlifeCampus ABSA report, 2005). Other tourist ventures, such a 
lodge, also require huge capital outlay and are dependent on factors such as if there is 











5.2 Private land conservation incentives 
"Regardless of how descriptively precise, reliable, and theoretically rigorous 
a measure might be, it is likely to be ignored or ineffective at influencing 
conservation decisions if it fails to reflect environmental qualities society 
understands and cares about. " 
Robertson & Hull, 2001 
In addressing the key question whether a property rate is a viable incentive for 
conservation, private landowners were asked questions relating to property rates and 
conservation. In trying to ascertain which incentives would encourage landowners to 
conserve renosterveld, landowners were presented with fifteen incentives and asked to 
rate these incentives on a scale of one to ten. This addresses in part the key question what 
incentives would motivate or influence a landowner's decision to conserve. 
Property rate as an incentive to landowners 
90% of private landowners considered 100% municipal tax rebate to be a conservation 
incentive (Figure 12) and landowners think that a property rate rebate would be more of an 
incentive than free fire protection and alien clearing (48% agreed, t 4% unsure,38% 
disagreed). 
Private property owners who have property with special nature reserve status are not 
levied rates at this stage. Farmers were asked whether they are prepared to co-opt their 
lands into a contractual conservation agreement and 60% of farmers agreed. However it 
was not stated that this land would have to be conserved in perpetuity (Figure 12). 
86% of landowners said that a rebate for conservation would impress them that the local 











Landowners were previously only liable for Regional Service Levies and the Property 
Rates Act has increased the rates that farmers have to pay. 47% of the farmers said they 
were unhappy about the 80% agricultural exemption (19% unsure )(Figure 12). There is a 
belief that farmers should not pay municipal rates because they do not receive municipal 
services. 
10 % AGREED. % DID NOT KNOW 0 % DISAGREED I 
To qualify for a rate rebate, I am prepared to co-opt my 
natural land into a contractural agreement 
Rate rebates for conservation would impress me that the local 
government is making a conservation effort 
Free fire protection & alien clearing is more of an incentive 
than a municipal rate rebate 
A 100% municipal tax rebate (for renosterveld) is an incentive 
to save natural vegetation on farms 
80% property rate rebate that the City of Cape Town is giving 
for agricultural land is suffucient 
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Incentives were rated by the landowner on a scale of 1-10. Financial incentives were 
expected to be more popular than other incentives, but landowners differed in their 
incentive preferences. There is not one prominent incentive preferred over the others. 
The least popular incentive was an annual dinner with prizes. 
The incentive that had the highest rating score was assistance with alien clearing (Figure 
13). This is surprising in that alien clearing does not appear to pose as a huge problem on 
these farms with 63% of landowners having no alien vegetation or properties that are less 
than 10% infested (Figure 4). 
Landowners are not likely to get substantial financial property rebates, but they give a 
municipal rate rebate a high rank as a conservation incentive. A property rebate as an 
incentive is only marginally less than alien clearing assistance. A grant or subsidy and 
income tax deductions are both economic incentives and were rated as the next preferred 
incentive. Each incentive has some appeal to a landowner. 
A Kruskal-Wallace ANOV A was used to test the null hypothesis that there was no 
difference in the score allocated to different incentives. There is evidence of significant 
differences between the incentives (H 81.882, df 14, p = <0.001). A significant 
difference exists (Table 2) between the incentives with the highest score and those with 
the lowest score. Assistance with alien clearing was the incentive with the most 












TABLE 4: The Kruskal-Wallis One Way Analysis of Variance on each individual incentive 
(H= 81.882 with 14 degrees of freedom (P = < 0.001) There is a statistically significant difference 
(P = < 0.001))* 
All Pairwise Multiple Comparison Procedures (Dunn's Method): 
Comparison of 
VARIABLE 1 VARIABLE 2 Q' P<0.05 
alien clearing annual dinner with prizes 5.601 significant 
alien clearing public recognition 4.605 significant 
alien clearing Capenature perks 4.088 significant 
alien clearing course eco-mangement 3.626 significant 
alien clearing assisted fire management 3.566 significant 
municipal rate rebate annual dinner with prizes 5.362 significant 
municipal rate rebate public recognition 4.367 significant 
municipal rate rebate Capenature perks 3.850 significant 
income tax deductions annual dinner with prizes 4.931 significant 
income tax deductions public recognition 3.936 significant 
grant or subsidy annual dinner with prizes 4.744 significant 
grant or subsidy public recognition 3.749 significant 
more information annual dinner with prizes 3.836 significant 
free legal advice annual dinner with prizes 3.684 significant 
renosterveld eco-Iabel annual dinner with prizes 3.523 significant 
*3 pairs were not significantly different and 87 were not tested 
The incentives were grouped together in an attempt to establish whether economic factors 
were considered more important to landowners. 
Financial incentives attained the highest score, representing 24% of the total (Table 5), 
while public recognition was the lowest scored group. The grouped incentives are 
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A Kruskal- Wallace ANOY A was used to compare differences between the groups (H = 
43.914, df 4, p = <0.001) . The pairwise multiple comparisons (Table 5) show that there 
were significant differences. 
The financial group had a higher score than the other groups and was significantly 
different from all groups except management. Management was significantly different 











TABLE 5 : The Kruskal-Wallis One Way Analysis of Variance on each group of incentives 
(H = 43.914 with 4 degrees of freedom (P < 0.001). There is a statistically significant 
difference (P = <0.001)). 
All Pairwise Multiple Comparison Procedures (Dunn's Method): 
Comparison of 
VARIABLE 1 VARIABLE 2 Q' P<0.05 
financial public recognition 6.073 significant 
financial other 4.265 significant 
financial extension/information 3.773 significant 
financial management 2.484 not significant 
management public recognition 3.589 significant 
management other 1.781 not significant 
management extension/information 1.289 no test 
extension/information public recognition 2.300 not significant 
extension/information other 0.492 no test 
other public recognition 1.808 no test 
Stewardship programs have been initiated in certain areas in the Western Cape a nd 
options depend on management and land use rights. Landowners were asked their view 
on conserving renosterveld and whether they wished to participate in a conservation 
scheme. 
All landowners (one unsure) believe that they are likely to save the renosterveld on their 
farms in any case (Figure 16). The majority (60%) would be happy for Cape Nature to 
manage the natural fynbos on their property but would not be prepared to sell this land to 
a conservation agency (76%). Most landowners believe farmers do not have extra 
finances needed to manage their natural vegetation (69%) but that most farmers are 











0% AGREED • % DID NOT KNOW 0 % DISAGREED 
I am in any case likely to save the 
renosterveld on my farm 
I would be happy to allow CNC or another 
conservation organisation to manage the 
natural fynbos on my property 
I would be prepared to sell my land with 
natural vegetation to a conservation 
agency 
Most farmers do not have the extra 
finances needed for managing their 
natural vegetation 
Most farmers are conservationists at 
heart 
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 
Figure 16: What landowners think about conserving renosterveld (n=58) 
The perception that renosterveld is likely to be saved in any case alludes to the fact that 
renosterveld conservation on private lands may be considered unnecessary. However in 
70% of circumstances, the renosterveld had not been ploughed for topographical reasons 
(Figure 17) or because the soil was thought to be of too poor quality. Half of the private 
landowners selected conservation or eco-tourism as the future plan for their renosterveld 
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5.3 Implications of a property rate rebate for local government 
"We have a responsibility, a rejponsibility oj making sure that we are 
accountable to our communities, a responsibility oj making sure that we hear 
the jootsteps of the people behind us. " 
Nomaindia Mfeketeo, Mayor of Cape Town 
Local governments can have a significant impact on private land conservation by offering 
tax and other incentives and in some countries incentive programmes which exempt, 
rebate or reduce property rates have been successfully implemented. 
In South Africa, the instigation of the Property Rates Act has meant that property tax is 
regulated nationally but is taxed in both the urban and rural environment, which now fall 
under wall to wall municipalities (Paterson, 2005). Local governments are empowered to 
set their own property taxes and this provides an opportunity for local governments to 
reduce or abolish property taxes on lands that have complied with certain regulations or 
been secured in perpetuity for conservation. In examining whether a property rate is a 
viable incentive for conservation it is necessary to understand both the economic 
implications for the municipality and the likelihood of municipalities instigating such a 
rate rebate or exemption is done with specific reference to the CCT. 
5.3.1 Rates as revenue 
Property taxes provide the largest source of tax revenue for local governments and the 
primary means through which local councils raise revenue from their local communities. 
The CCT levies rates on both land and improvements and has a planned regular property 
valuation every four years. The 2005-2006 draft budget sources of revenue totals 
R13,969 million with rates providing 17.1% (R2,390 million) and the RSC levies 6.6% 
(R928 million). Arrears for the City were 2.4 billion and this led to the formulation of 
new indigent policies offering poverty relief to those unable to afford rates and service 











over the past four years from 28% in 200112002 to 25% in 2002/2003 and 34% in 
2003/2004 but the revenue percentage from rates in fact remains at about 25%, because 
the capital growth includes external capital funding, such as the R2 billion for Gateway 
housing project (M Richardson, Director of Budgets, CCT, pers. comm.). 
The CCT has set their rates policy, which gives a special rebate to agricultural property of 
80% (CCT Rates Policy, 2005). Examples of municipal rate levies for agricultural 
property are set out in Table 6. 
TABLE 6: Annual property rate for agricultural property valued at one million rand 
MUNICIPALITY RATE RATE ON R1 MILLION 
Cape Town cent-in the-rand 0.00323 R 3230 
Stellenbosch cent-in the-rand 0.3448 R 34 4800 
Stellenbosch Winelands district 5 cent-in the-rand 0.1627 R 162700 
Drakenstein cent-in the-rand 0.00272 R2720 
Swartland cent-in the-rand 0.0028 R 2800 
The annual rates on agricultural property valued at one million rand, was calculated for 
each of the listed municipalities (Table 6). The property rate ranges from R 2720 in the 
Drakenstein municipality to R 34 4800 for agricultural property in Stellenbosch. This 
discrepancy indicates the ability of different local governments to set their own rate 
policy. 
The CCT has engaged in considerable debate around the issue of rebating rates on 
conservation property, both built and natural. The decision is that if an owner has 
beneficial occupation (rights of use) no rebate would be granted (M Richardson, pers. 
comm.). Land ceded to provincial protected areas, in terms of legislation, is excluded 
from municipal rates (Property Rates Act), but all other privately conserved land is 
subject to differential taxation rates. According to the CCT rates policy, virgin land 
zoned for agriculture, pays rates that are 80% exempt, but virgin land on residential 











rate policy is reviewed annually but unless there is considerable intervention the existing 
rebate policy will generally be ratified (M Richardson, pers. comm.) 
The CCT Spatial Development Framework identifies the need to address the inequitable 
access to nature, but the bulk of the CCT capital expenditure (63.4%) is allocated for 
creating integrated human settlements (2005-2006 draft Capital Budget, lOP theme). The 
implications of this are that the emphasis in municipalities is on social issues and it is the 
inequitable access to nature that is funded rather than nature itself; no funding is allocated 
to private land conservation. 
City of Cape Town: Calculating the potential rates loss 
The CCT has 422 registered farms with a land value of R617,038,280 an improvement 
value of R187,317,000 and a total value of R804,355,280 (CCT Draft Rates Rebate 
Scheme, 2002). The total property rates levied on these farm properties are Rl1 ,367,149 
and an 80% exemption for all agricultural properties, means an annual rates loss of 
R9,093,719 (CCT Draft Rates Rebate Scheme, 2002). This R9,093,719 reflects the rates 
loss from the agricultural rebate currently in effect. The financial implications of a 
potential further exemption for conserved land in the CMA are examined. 
In the CMA there are approximately 132 remnants of renosterveld on 6433 ha of 
renosterveld (CCT Environmental Dept, GIS data) and this includes farms on the 
Bottelary Hills (now excluded from the CMA). In estimating the potential financial loss 
the CCT would get from a rate rebate for conserved land, renosterveld remnants known to 
be developed or to belong to the CCT and totalling 1580.9 hectares, were excluded. 
According to the Property Rates Act, 2004, the rates on these properties depend on the 
market value of the property. In the CMA, agricultural property values vary considerably 
and so annual property rates of the remaining renosterveld were calculated using both a 
high and a low estimated property value (Table 7). These annual property rates are 











The value of R45 000 ha- I is the municipal market valuation of agricultural property and 
appears to be slightly lower than the going market price, unless the market value is 
known from a recent sale. Some farms have not been sold for generations and the true 
market value is unknown, the municipal market value is about 1/4 of the potential market 
value so the property rate value of renosterveld using the lower property value is 
probably more realistic. 
TABLE 7 : Estimated annual property rate loss from renosterveld fragments in the CCT 
LAND PROPERTY VALUE ANNUAL PROPERTY RATES 
market value = no of ha x value of ha Bottelary Hills market value % of total CCT rate revenue 
(351.25 hecta res) x 0,00323 (R2,390 million) 
HIGH Including Bottelary R 5485299 0,230% 
R 350 000 per hectare (4852,1 hal 
Excluding botttelary R 5088211 0,213% 
(4500,85 hal 
LOW Including Bottelary R 705 253 0,030% 
R 45 000 per hectare 
Excluding botttelary R 654199 0,027% 
If all renosterveld fragments were exempt from property rates, regardless of whether the 
land is in perpetuity or not, indications are that the CCT would have a maximum financial 
property rate loss of 0.23% should they offer a rate exemption for renosterveld valued at 
R350 000 per hectare (Table 7). A more realistic minimum property rate loss on land 
valued at R 45000 per hectare is only 0.027% of the total budget. 
5.3,2 Property rates as an incentive for conservation 
Local governments are able to use property rates as an incentive to encourage good 
practice by private landholders, and internationally legally binding contracts (easements 
or covenants) are usually required to qualify for these tax benefits. 
South African municipalities are required by law to produce an lOP on which the annual 
council budget should be based and in 2002/2003 all municipalities were required to 











integrated and therefore the IDPs have had little meaningful impact on budgets (Carter, 
2004). These two budgets are difficult to align, as the operating budget is structured in a 
way that reflects what, not where, money has been spent (M Richardson, pers. comm.). 
The importance of IDPs are that they are guided by the PSDF which have, at least in the 
Western Cape, taken biodiversity planning into consideration and this in turn influences 
the local government SDF which could in turn influence the municipal rate policy. 
One concern is that not all revenue due from communities IS being collected by 
municipalities and the "causes of this are economic, structural and, in some instances, 
political" (Carter, 2004). Municipalities have other tax options namely a Regional Service 
Tax (RSC), a business tax or a local fund tax. RSC taxes are currently levied but will be 
abolished and replaced with possibly a more obvious business tax, but these taxes are 
seen as more of revenue generating tool than to be of potential benefit to conservation 











5.4 What motivates private landowners to conserve 
Overexploitation and habitat degradation are serious problems, but they 
require thoughtful solutions that run with the grain of human nature 
(Henderson & Sutherland, 1997) 
The key question "what would motivate a landowner to conserve?" is addressed in this 
section. Motivational incentives, described as measures that influence the way that people 
think and vital as part of a package of strategies to promote conservation, are a complex 
challenge, especially in developing countries. In developing countries, economic 
incentives are less likely because finances tend to be allocated to necessary social needs, 
unless considerable donor funding is available for conservation. 
Rural landowners as a diverse group of people with different values that are 'not bound 
by a single land philosophy' (James, 2002), demanded further investigation in order to 
understand what would motivate private landowners to conserve. This understanding 
could inform the development of appropriate motivational incentives. 
The results of the qualitative data were difficult to present as such. Grounded theory was 
applied to the data. Thematic categories (nodes) were related and reassembled to 
construct links in an attempt to understand the social phenomena of farmers. In this 
analysis it emerged that a sense of heritage plays the central role in influencing farmers to 
conserve. This sense of heritage was a theme that continuously emerged from the data 
and much of what the farmers said was ultimately linked to heritage. 
Heritage impacts on how farmers perceive their world and although 'people will always 
discount the future to some degree (Penn, 2003), farming communities are more aware of 
future generations because many farmers have inherited their farms and envisage their 
children as farmers. Some farmers are utilitarian and have a 'more economic, exploitative 
view and act largely to maximize profit' (James, 2002), but many farms have been in 











future and is reflected in the following quotes (translated): "renosterveld is pretty, its 
history from that century to now, we must conserve our history for our children to see" 
(translated) "every farm must keep some for the next generation, every farm must 
conserve some (renosterveld) " 
"it's a heritage thing, we are custodians if we don't conserve no-one will" 
Heritage does not only imply something handed down by tradition, but includes the 
natural environment and the sentiment around the farming tradition. Farmers are linked to 
the past and many claim to value what's left because (translated) 'it is as it was'. 
Farmers show a strong emotional connection to their land which includes an appreciation 
of the beauty of renosterveld. 
"1 like the fine close up details of the fynbos, it looks like the Tygerberg that 1 know. It 
stops erosion and looks good and natural and is a home to our animals, there is not so 
much left so we must save it for the filture before there is none left" 
"1 was shocked by the map of 1000's of years ago how vegetation has been changed by 
agriculture. 1 like the beauty of fynbos. its part of something rare and endangered ... 
thrilled of conserving things on red data list that are unique to Western Cape. Some 
plants are so rare and endangered like the dodo, when it has an endangered status it 
triggers an emotion - don't know much but aware it is scarce" 
(translated) "Swartland was renosterveld and (there are) few pockets left where we still 
see animals, small animals, all sorts of animals; geometric tortoise, buck. cats etc. They 
are still in their natural stale and we must conserve what's left because once it is 
destroyed it is impossible to rehabilitate" 
Rosenzweig (2003) describes how a 'family farms offers a profoundly different world ... 
economic balance sheets may resist quantifying their cultural wealth and values, but it 











family fann'. Koelle and Oettle (2003) elaborate about the fanners' sense of place, 
which is often not recognized 'in the analysis of conditional values', but can influence 
management decisions and connect the farmer to his personal and family history. 
"I want to preserve it, it provides a linkage with the past. I grew up with a woodstove ... , 
I hanker after simpler times and links with tradition. it means something that the "heart 
of family" sentiment Ues with renosterveld, (over and) above a practical income ... we just 
grit our teeth because we want to save some for the family, .. you need a linK' 
"it's the only place on the farm that for centuries has not been ploughed and worked, it's 
hundreds of years of pure nature as it was, my oupa and ouma came and sat here too, 
there is so little natural veld left in the ',f/estern Cape we must keep it, it looks good and 
the landscape (looks good) from the air" 
Farmers made only a few references to finances such as "needing subsidies for viable 
(conservation) propositions". One fanner said "society must pay - (conservation) cannot 
be borne by individual landowners", which is a statement much reiterated by private 
landowners everywhere and fanners have been burdened with 'duty of care'. 
Transparency is also important to fanners where it was commented, "don't make empty 
promises eg rates, on the whole be realistic" Clear and concise conservation options need 
to be offered in a simple but flexible plan, because conservation measures have often in 
the past been tied in complicated bureaucratic red tape and been ineffective (Wentworth 
Model, 2003). 
Farmers in this research often expressed a need for conservation extension. The 
importance of good extension is well recognized and maintaining good relationships 
which improve landholder public relations is hugely beneficial and indeed crucial for 
attaining good conservation (Winter, 2003), Meaningful interactions are often made on 
visits to fanns and the landowners involvement 'allows the worth of research to extend 
beyond its intrinsic value' (Hilty & Merenlender, 2003) because personal interactions 











medium' (McDowell et aI., 1998). This is reflected in the farmers' statements about 
extension. 
"a chap with veld should be visited by people if they have time.... a morning with coffee 
is a month's work and he (the farmer) is inspired to do (conservation) 'work" 
"make it (conservation) worthwhile in combination with extension" 
"someone responsible must come tofarms and talk to people staying on the farms (about) 
why its necessary to conserve" 
(translated),,(someone must) go and talk to people and encourage them" 
"high turnover of (extension) personal is frustrating" 
Although landholder education regarding the scarcity of coastal renosterveld is 
recognized as a necessity (Winter, 2003) it is again evident that farmers want more 
information because they expressed the necessity of educating everyone about 
renosterveld. 
"people must be told 'i1hatfjmbos is and keep it clean like years ago" 
"educate people staying here about the value of the veld' 
"teach people about fynbos and the herbal uses of it so people can get an interest in it" 
The merits of education are important but 'are most effective for triggering change when 
it shows how the destruction of the environment harms individual interests' (Penn,2003). 
In other words if elimination of renosterveld can be shown to affect the individual interest 
of the farmer, by for example, emphasizing that if renosterveld continues to decline, their 
grandchildren will not have the privilege of experiencing renosterveld, then the 











The fanners' link to the past was established through; their children and grandchildren, 
the appreciation that renosterveld was always there and emotional connections such as 
the beauty of the renosterveld spring. This led to the conclusion that a sense of heritage 
emerged as the most important contribution to fanners' appreciation of renosterveld and 












6. CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
''Nature conservation is a complex and diverse challenge, and successful nature 
conservation is ultimately not about biological and technical issues. It is about 
people, about community attitudes and actions, about political and economic 
issues, and about the actions of professionals and the organisations charged 
with responsibility for nature conservation. ' 
(Bennett et aI., 1995) 
The diverse challenge of nature conservation implies that the answers to the key 
questions addres sed in this research are complex. Although the larger proportion of 
landowners with renosterveld fragments perceive that they will keep the renosterveld 
fragments on their farms this does not imply conservation complacency. 
The issue of land-use change as a continuing threat to renosterveld is explored as are 
property rate rebates. Participation in conservation by both landowners and local 
government needs significant motivation. Motivational incentives as a conservation 
incentive are potentially powerful but further investigation and an improved 
understanding of these motivational incentives is required. 
Private landowners' perceptions and opportunity costs of renosterveld 
In this research what is of most importance is that all farmers perceive that they will keep 
the renosterveld on their farms and the majority had not thought of any alternative land 
use. Most farmers perceive that the reason their renosterveld is not used for agriculture is 
topographical and they predict that if they developed their renosterveld their income 
would be much lower than the income obtained from the other agricultural lands on their 
farm. These perceptions should indicate that landowners in the CMA and surrounds are 
unlikely to develop their renosterveld in future but no assumptions should be made unlcss 











There are perceived and real opportunity costs for renosterveld in the studied area. 
Although low, the major concern is that these potentially threaten the remaining 
remnants. Fairbanks et aI., (2004) suggest that the wine industry does not pose a threat to 
preserving biodiversity in the CFR, unless the local wine industry expands into the world 
market. Indications are that the South African wine industry in premium quality grapes is 
indeed expanding rapidly in international markets; by way of example, South African 
wine exports in 2006 are expected to double in the USA, which is the world's largest 
wine consumer (S. Birch, WOSA in !itt.). Smaller producers are advised that 'if you are 
a small player, you will need a premium price to be profitable' (T. Rands, Vinimark, in 
lilt. ). 
Over eighty percent of producers produce less than 500 tons of grapes (P Spies, VinPro in 
litt.). Whereas prospects for smaller wine producers currently look good for those 
producing premium quality grapes, the outlook for producers of lesser quality grapes is 
somewhat gloomier. The predicted plantings in 2008 will not exceed estimated 
uprootings for both red and white wines (SA WlS, Production and Market Estimates 
2004-2008). Although this suggests that land for vineyards will not need to be extended, 
renosterveld is nevertheless threatened by these developments. This is firstly because 
premium varieties such as sauvignon blanc seek higher, cooler, southerly facing slopes, 
where much of the remaining renosterveld exists on such prime terroir and secondly 
because some boutique wineries can afford to run at a loss, because they are tax breaks 
for other businesses, and therefore may seek undeveloped or uneconomic slopes for 
vines. 
Landowners estimated that olives would produce the second highest income per hectare, 
and rumours about potential olive prices abound. Although olive crops are extremely 
variable and good money can potentially be made from marketing olive products, olives 
are not expected to produce good returns within the first ten years after planting. Olives 
may potentially pose a greater threat to renosterveld, in that there is a perception amongst 
landowners that they are not only profitable but can grow on marginal stony ground. This 












Neither commercial buchu nor wheat is seen as a threat to renosterveld in the area 
studied. Although commercial buchu predicts exceptionally good economic returns, 
buchu is dependent on alluvial soils which only exist in some renosterveld. The 
commercial buchu industry is in its infancy and is more likely to threaten renosterveJd in 
areas further afield. The wheat industry in the Swartland has suffered in the past few 
years and predicted market trends indicate that wheat plantings will not currently be 
expanding. Wheat yields are related to rainfall and the threat of reduced or variable 
rainfall with climate change may discourage any further development of wheat lands in 
the Swartland (Turpie, 2003c). 
Eco-tourism and game farming are perceived by landowners as potentially a good use for 
renosterveld. However, most fragments of renosterveld are small, game farms require 
huge capital outlays to develop and are only sustainable if there is relatively little 
competition from other game farms in the same area. Game farms do not qualify as 
agricultural land and hence are not presently entitled to any agricultural land rate rebate. 
Although it is unlikely that any form of such property rate rebate will be approved for 
renosterveld used primarily for eco-tourism, such tourism itself is not seen as a threat to 
the preservation of renosterveld as it self-evidently requires the renosterveld to remain 
intact. On the other hand, whilst many appreciate the beauty of renosterveld especially in 
the spring, renosterveld vegetation is rather drab for tourists. The tourism potential 
would appear to lie rather in the splendid view from a restaurant, potential game drives, 
hiking and 4X4 adventure trails, or sophisticated accommodation in the country. 
The economics of farming are not always understood as landowners often pursue 
ventures that are clearly uneconomical and it should be recognised that assessing the 
relative opportunity costs to landowners may have limited worth as a means of predicting 
the threats to renosterveld. The paucity of renosterveld, the desire for cooler slopes to 
plant premium wine varieties and the continual ploughing of renosterveld without 











Threats to renosterveld - land use change 
Climate change, alien infestation and land use change were suggested as the three main 
threats to renosterveld. Climate change is not addressed. As few farmers indicated serious 
alien infestation in their renosterveld, possibly, because alien infestations such as alien 
grasses are not recognised, only land-use change as a threat is discussed. 
Agriculture is the biggest cause of land use change in the CFR (Latimer et aI., 2004). 
With renosterveld mainly situated on agricultural land, land-use change is therefore the 
biggest threat to renosterveld and any further land-use change needs to be prevented. 
Biodiversity strategies are beginning to be incorporated into planning policy such as the 
Western Cape PDSF. Albeit land prices for commercial land are attractive, a defined 
urban edge and the new PDSF, once both are adopted and implemented, should halt 
further rezoning of any agricultural land with renosterveld and development of these 
areas should then be prevented. There is also a perception by both developers and farmers 
that Provincial Government is strictly enforcing EIA recommendations for biodiversity 
conservation (A. Beukes, Firstplan Town Planners, pers. comm.), from which it may be 
inferred that developers and farmers are more likely in future to respect the laws that 
protect renosterveld. 
Conservation incentives for private landowners 
Fehr and Falk (2002) argue that the 'narrow view of human motivation may severely 
limit understanding the determinants and effects of incentives'. Indeed, previous 
assumptions about what landowners want have meant that private biodiversity protection 
was 'uncoordinated with the interest of the landowners' (Tikka & Kauppi, 2003). If 
conservation incentives are to be used to promote private conservation, clearly we need to 
know which incentives private landowners want. Private landowners conserving 
renosterveld are positively affecting biodiversity and any motivational or economic 
incentive that encourages conservation of renosterveld would be worth pursuing. 
This research suggests that financial incentives as a group are clearly more attractive than 











no single incentive that is more desirable than any others. This lends support to the 
conclusions of others that a suite of incentives is more likely to be effective (Bateson, 
2001; Crosthwaite, 2000). 
Economic incentives 
In South Africa, apart from Working for Water, which operates mainly on state land, and 
other projects which incorporate a strong focus on the provision of jobs or poverty 
alleviation, economic incentives for private land conservation are limited or non existent. 
South Africa has suffered with racial discriminations in the past as a result of which the 
development of redressive socio-economic infrastructure places the greatest claim on 
public finances. Finances for conservation, which for many appear an unnecessary 
luxury, compete with glaring social issues. There is simply not enough money for 
substantial compensation for conservation of renosterveld, but small compensations, like 
that of a property rate rebate, could have a symbolic psychological significance. 
"No matter how sophisticated, conservation planning cannot afford to ignore economic 
forces at play and should also serve the goal of maximising benefits to society" (Turpie et 
aI., 2003a). In wealthier and more developed countries, financial incentives are often 
supplied by affluent philanthropists, but in less developed countries social issues are often 
prioritized above conservation issues and financial incentives need to be supported with 
foreign funds (Scherr & McNeely, 2002). Nevertheless financial mechanisms are 
powerful drivers for changing the way that people farm (Halweil, 2002) and financial 
rewards that meet or surpass the opportunity costs of developing renosterveld would no 
doubt encourage private landowners to conserve. 
Alien clearing as an incentive 
Although very few farms bore obvious signs of infestation by alien vegetation, almost all 
the farmers interviewed felt that assistance with dealing with alien vegetation clearing 











deploy significant labour and time resources towards maintaining their lands free of alien 
vegetation. Indeed, landowners not only identified alien clearing costs as the most 
expensive maintenance cost in conserving renosterveld, but ranked assistance with alien 
vegetation clearing as the most popular incentive. Most landowners moreover believe 
they do not have the extra finances needed to manage their natural vegetation. 
Assistance, whether financial or by way of other support (labour, poison or equipment) 
with alien vegetation clearing therefore has the potential to be a good conservation 
incentive and indeed is currently offered under some circumstances. Money for alien 
vegetation clearing is available under certain circumstances, from the Department of 
Agriculture, Working for Water and World Wildlife Fund for Nature. Money is available 
for clearing water catchments, but the process of obtaining funding for alien clearing is 
not transparent to farmers. Conservancies that motivate for funding may receive alien 
clearing assistance usually in the form of herbicide and this in itself is an incentive to join 
a conservancy. 
It is unclear to what extent a more vigorous enforcement of alien clearing legislation 
would be effective in practice. Apart from the unaffordable expense (Pence et aI., 2003), 
landowners perceive that local government does not itself comply with legislation, but 
rather adopts a position of 'do as I say but not as I do'. The perceived inequity of 
enforcement in these circumstances is evidently a factor in discouraging compliance by 
landowners with the existing formal legal system. Local government would do well to 
clear Schedule 1-3 declared weeds off municipal properties within their jurisdiction as a 
clear indication of its own commitment to the law and the importance it places generally 
on conservation. 
Other municipal services as an incentive 
The use of other municipal services to support conservation initiatives, for example 
making available to landowners existing municipal resources to assist with fire 
management, fencing and security, would promote a collaborative public-private culture 
of conservation. Municipal assistance with fire management and alien clearing are 











of utilising a public good service such as fire-fighting and prevention are very high. 
Making available such services to private landowners for conservation purposes would 
face the same difficulties as the introduction of a property tax rebate system, namely lack 
of funding, the need to convince local government that conservation incentives are 
necessary and the capacity within the local government to instigate them. 
A property rate rebate as an incentive 
A property rate rebate or exemption is highly recommended as a conservation incentive 
because any economic gain could help reduce the costs of conservation and deliver a 
good conservation message. Three issues are reviewed in trying to determine the extent to 
which a rate rebate would be an incentive for private landowners, namely: (i) the 
identification of what would persuade farmers to participate, (ii) the need to convince 
municipalities of the benefit and (iii) the question of land value. 
i) Identification of what would persuade landowners to participate in conservation 
Landowners rated a municipal property rate rebate highly as a conservation incentive, 
confirming that a tax rebate for conserved land would convey the message that local 
government is committed to conservation, even though the financial gain from any such 
municipal rebate would only provide a marginal financial benefit to the farmer. 
Since most renosterveld is remnant vegetation and in any event levied as agricultural 
land, the rates of which have already been significantly reduced and after taking into 
account the tax deductions already permitted for capital expenditure incurred in 
agricultural development, the overall potential financial gain for the farmers, using such a 
property rebate system, would be low. Ifowever the symbolic significance for landowners 
of a rebate system should not be overlooked. 
It may be concluded that, however financially minimal, such a property rate rebate 
system would have an important symbolic significance in demonstrating the local 
government's appreciation for the conservation efforts of landowners and public 











addressing the perception of many farmers that the new government is not committed to 
supporting the agricultural industry, an impression gained since the removal of 
agricultural subsidies and what are often seen as restrictive labour law and tenancy 
regulations. 
Combining fragments into conservancies would be more beneficial than individual efforts 
but conservancies do not bind land in perpetuity. Placing conserved land into co-
operation agreements is a complex issue because such agreements are binding on future 
landowners (Merenlender et aI., 2004). The majority of landowners in this research were 
prepared to co-opt their natural land into a contractual conservation agreement and were 
happy for Cape Nature to manage the natural fynbos on their property, but expressed a 
strong unwillingness to sell this land to a conservation agency. Most were unaware that 
such land would have to be conserved in perpetuity. It was also clear that most 
landowners are reluctant to place their land under any legally-binding agreement because 
they feel insecure about present land refonn policies. 
The majority of fanns in South Africa are owned by the white minority population group. 
The government is committed to redistributing thirty percent of fanning land to other race 
groups by 2014 (Didiza, 2004). Some private landowners expressed concern that setting 
aside land for conservation might indicate to government that these lands are unused and 
under-utilised and accordingly available for expropriation and redistribution purposes (0. 
Parker, farmer, pers. comm.). Landowners need to be reassured that all levels of 
government have a constitutitional mandate to protect the environment and that those 
areas of conservation importance are now identified in the provincial and local SDF's. 'If 
conservation land is rezoned as a protected area through the correct procedures, any 
resettlement without consideration of the biodiversity provisions would be in 
contravention of multiple regulations administered through various government 
departments or agencies and hence more difficult to redistribute for socio-political 











ii) Convincing municipalities of the benefits 
Local governments often "tend to rely on vague and generalised statements of 
aspirations It (Barton & Bruder, 1997) and the difficulties in persuading local governments 
to conserve natural vegetation include the belief that this is the responsibility of national 
government. Success depends on the inspiration of key individuals, financial resources, 
capacity and institutional support but "ultimately, political will is driven by community 
attitudes and perceptions" (Binning et aI., 1999; Swift et aI., 2003). 
Property rates in South Africa are a contentious issue because local revenue is understood 
to be needed for vital social reforms. Municipalities are setting their own rate policies and 
clearly have the capacity to set a rate policy that exempts virgin land from property rates. 
If all renosterveld fragments in the CMA were exempt from property rates the loss is 
estimated at a small percentage of the total budget (0.027%). This is a small price to pay 
for conserving biodiversity that is irreplaceable. A rate rebate needs to be negotiated with 
all stakeholders and justified in the annual municipal rates policy and "from a policy 
point of view it is always problematic to open the door to any special arrangement for one 
- albeit small - group or category of ratepayers" (Franzsen, 2005 in litt). The problem is 
that although the impact on the revenue may be negligible, "on other taxpayers, pressure 
groups, councillors and even the cost of administration, (the rate rebate impact) may be 
significant" (Franzsen, 2005, in litt.). 
The double challenge lies in convincing local government of the importance of the role 
they can play in private land conservation and on the need to do this as a priority, in spite 
of their commitment to address the economic discrepancies within the community. One 
can appreciate that local governments will be hesitant to spend money in supporting 
something of national interest in the same way that farmers resent being expected to bear 











iii) Clarifying the question of conservation land value 
The issue of defining value is important because one of the big concerns about the rebate 
route is how to determine the extent of the rebate (R Franzsen, 2005 in Zitt.). This raises 
the question of conservation value, which is essential both in determining what land is 
worthy of conservation and how this conservation value is defined. 
Biodiversity is valued in terms of its natural capital (Constanza & Daly, 1992) and the 
potential global benefits compared to cost of nature conservation are vast (Balmford et 
aI., 2002). Natural capital uses special methods to estimate value, such as contingent 
valuation WTP (willingness to pay) and relatively high existence values were found for 
biodiversity in South Africa with WTP in the fynbos biome approximately R21.50 ha-1 
yea{1 (Turpie et. ai., 2003a). Value is described in different ways and Sinden (2004) 
describes the indirect gains of conserving biodiversity having existence values, bequest 
value and option values. Zhang & Li (2005) refer to value as "use-value or exchange-
value. "Exchange-value can be exchanged for a good to an individual, the WTP, or it can 
be the exchange-value of a good to society, the price, and these two economic values are 
often confused". 
Defining value is important as there is a need to determine a simple and robust value 
scale. Biodiversity Habitat Units (Cowling and Heijnis 2001) with a defined rating scale 
could provide the conservation value to natural vegetation. Determining a rate rebate on 
agricultural land with differences in potential profitability and therefore a different 
market value becomes complicated when both lands have a high conservation value. The 
definition of conservation value in robust economic terms then becomes problematic. 
Logically land of high conservation value should qualify for the lowest rural tax. If: by 
way of example, the property rate for renosterveld were to be rebated on two fragments 
of renosterveld of equally high conservation value, should land with a higher market 
value receive greater financial compensation for a hectare of alien-infested renosterveld 
than a hectare of land of a lower market value where the farmer has paid to keep the 
fragment clean. The prevention of overcompensation or misuse of exemptions has been 











A rate rebate scheme could be guided by the municipal plan which accounts for every 
hectare of land. The positive impact of a rate rebate for conservation far outweigh the 
difficulties in setting up such a scheme. It is recognised that local governments have a 
responsibility to the community and the environment (Bateson, 2001). The challenge in 
South Africa will be to persuade both local government and private landowners that all 
biodiversity has a conservation value that will ultimately benefit society. 
Motivational incentives 
Motivational incentives that promote conservation have not yet been fully explored. Non-
financial motives shape human behaviour such as the desire to reciprocate, the desire to 
gain social approval (Fehr & Falk, 2002), and 'intrinsic satisfaction' (De Young, 2000). 
These motives can "interact with pecuniary incentives and can provide a deeper 
understanding of the effects of pecuniary incentives and an understanding of how 
psychological forces constitute incentives" (Fehr & Falk, 2002). Three aspects are 
reviewed, namely: (i) promoting existing motivational incentives, (ii) linking biodiversity 
to land reform and (iii) understanding motivational conservation behaviour. 
I. Promoting existing motivational incentives 
Social research has recognized the importance of good extension officers on the ground 
(NRF, Australia, 2004) and 'nothing can surpass personal co-operation with private 
landowners through direct extension in order to overcome misunderstandings, 
communicate relevant information and to determine ways of satisfying varied individual 
needs' (McDowell, 1988). 
Local research on the attitudes of farmers towards conservation has suggested that 
landholders need more information and extension (McDowell, 1988; Winter, 2003). This 
has been advocated for many years, but apart from pilot projects little or no regular 
conservation extension presently exists. "One extension officer on the ground does more 
than ten people in an office" (W Bester, farmer, pers. comm.) and although on the ground 











for winning the hearts and minds of even the most "difficult" of landowners" (Mc 
Dowell, 1988). 
A 'duty of care' is expected from landowners. There is, however, a conservation ethic 
among landowners who generally perceive themselves as conservationists at heart and 
'stewards' of the land (Shogren, 2003). The Conservation Stewardship Project In 
conjunction with the Department of Agriculture Area-Wide Planning initiative IS 
endeavouring to tie limited incentives to this stewardship ethic on private lands (The 
Conservation Stewardship Project, 2003). The Biodiversity and Wine Initiative (BWI) 
and Wines of South Africa (WOSA) have suggested to all grape farmers that the 
promotion of biodiversity and sustainable wine production would be a good international 
marketing tool and is in their best interest. The concept is an excellent one, but "BWI has 
been slow in roll-out because we're trying to do it credibly" (T Hansen, in litt., 2005). 
Although this strategy encourages farmers to protect and promote their renosterveld, 
there are many private landowners with renosterveld who do not export wine and would 
need the encouragement of other farmers to participate. The most efficient way to 
influence landowners is to get other landowners to influence them and this has been 
recognized by conservation groups who try to 'identify the champion'. Admired 
landowners who could claim conservation rebates and expound the merits of conserving 
renosterveld to neighbours, would have a far greater inf1uence than other conservation 
efforts. 
A 'renosterveld friendly' eco type label or a branded flagship species could be initiated 
for all products produced by landowners participating in a renosterveld conservation 
scheme and has been suggested but not persued. A coordinated effort is needed to make 
an eco-Iabel effective in biodiversity marketing and the "growing and novel sources of 
support; private philanthropy, premium pricing for biodiversity related goods via 












1. Linking biodiversity conservation to land reform 
"Land has emotive overtones everywhere in Africa" (Sibanda, 2001). AgriBEE is the 
agricultural framework for the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act (2003). 
The proposed "non-negotiability of a market-related dispensation" (Bosman, 2005) is of 
great concern to farmers who feel threatened by the practice of land invasion in 
neighbouring countries. 
The AgriBEE draft proposes seven indicators of empowerment (Codes of Good Practice) 
which include guidelines for broad-based BEE and a BEE Scorecard for large-scale 
enterprises. Corporate Social Investment 'programs in conservation projects; community 
clean-up programs and preservation of the natural environment. ' (Draft Transformation 
Charter for Agriculture, 2005) provides an opportunity for land of high conservation 
status to be accredited to an AgriBEE scorecard. Land of high conservation value could 
potentially be regarded as reformed land. If conserved land could be linked to the 
redistribution and reformation process, conservation of renosterveld and indeed many 
threatened eco-systems, could be resolved, making conservation an attractive land use 
option. The preservation of the natural environment can be seen as a public good that 
benefits all, especially those working farms. Special concessions could be allocated for 
priviledges such as collection of wild plants. 
This is an ambitious proposition. Land reform has many issues that still need to be 
resolved. In addressing the inequities of the past, little support can be anticipated for any 
perceived gain offered to perceived wealthy farmers, but the complicated non delivery of 
the promised high land reform rates could find solutions in conservation. More 
realistically, conservation in Africa is and will continue to be more about resource use 
economics than anything else. 
II. Understanding motivational conservation behaviour 
There is a need to find the best measures to save biodiversity but it is 'remarkable how 











trying to understand what incentives would motivate or influence a private landowners' 
decision to conserve, social psychological research tries to understand human behaviour 
and the way in which it influences individuals. The challenge in conservation is to try and 
positively change the way that people behave, in a way that benefits conservation. This is 
critical in a world where there is 'a dwindling awareness of biodiversity among the 
citizenry of most countries' (Cowling, 2004). 
Interdisciplinary research is slowly emerging and fields such as ecological economics and 
environmental psychology are addressing environmental issues (Penn, 2003). 
Conservation psychology is trying to understand why people act in an environmentally 
unsustainable way (Clayton & Brook, 2005) and until recently this has not been a focus 
of conservationists. Clayton & Brook (2005) propose that 'behaviour impacting the 
natural environment is a product of a person's situational context, past experiences, and 
motivations' and if actions are clearly understood, more environmentally friendly 
behaviour can be promoted. 
There is an individualistic side to human behaviour, but 'people are generally influenced 
by the larger spheres within which they are embedded, such as ethnic groups, professions, 
communities and states' (Hanna et al., 1996). This research emphasises the importance of 
heritage to farmers and suggests that farmers have a strong emotional connection and 
attachment to their land and that future generations are important. Penn (2003) states that 
'humans place greater emphasis on their family than the common good' and this is 
important when promoting conservation, because appeals should be made to landowners 
to conserve for their children and future generations, rather than to save biodiversity for 
the population at large. 
The success of a conservation project depends not only on ecological data but social 
mechanisms (Mathevet & Mauchamp, 2005). Alcoa World Aluminium in Australia 
relinquished some of their bauxite reserves for biodiversity, not only because of changing 
community attitudes and expectations but because people within the workforce did not 
want to work for a company that does not care for the environment (Gardner & 











should be channelled through social or informal networks (Brook et aI., 2003) and in this 
research it was interesting how many farmers were motivated by the prospect of joining a 
conservancy, not only because of the funding benefits, but because it pleased their 
neighbours and brought them together. 
Farmers are very influenced by their networks, by traditions and by other farmers. These 
undefined networks drive social pressure. People's 'attitudes and behaviour towards the 
natural world will remain intimately influenced by their social structures' (Hamilton, 
2001) and 'being better than the Jones" is an important motivation in human nature. If 
motivational incentives could be constructed in a way that influences landowners and 
those in their social network to believe that because they conserve renosterveld they are 
'better than the Jones," conservationists would be a great deal closer to achieving 
conservation goals. Penn (2003) states that "humans are highly social animals that care 
about their reputation, and social pressure appears to provide a strong incentive to change 
behaviour". The powerful impact that social pressure can have on conservation is not yet 
fully appreciated or explored (Penn, 2003 ; Fehr & Falk, 2002) and understanding the 
way that farmers think about conservation, or what motivates them to conserve and then 
changing their behaviour so that they want to conserve, opens a new ambit of research. 
Social marketing provides another strategy to change the way that people think about 
conservation (Kotler et al., 2002). "Perhaps the biodiversity sector needs to take a leaf out 
of the advertising manual and start investing in using the media more effectively to 
change human behaviour"(Cowling, 2004). As Penn (2003) suggests "advertisers are 
fuelling runaway consumption by exploiting our instinctive desires to maintain status in 
society and attract mates". Conservationist need to urgently communicate the problem of 
biodiversity loss to a world that is influenced by television and advertising and does not 
appreciate that there is a problem and indeed many landowners are unaware that 
renosterveld is in need of conservation. Advertising needs to exert social pressure to the 












If we want to manage the natural world successfully for the long-term benefit of all 
people, we need to understand why humans behave in the way that they do (Siegfried, 
2002). This ultimately depends on "a good appreciation of the reality of the human 
condition" (Hamilton, 2001). If private landowners are to keep the renosterveld on their 
farms, they must want to save renosterveld. 
Whilst opportunity costs for preserving renosterveld do exist, landowners' actual and 
perceived income benefit from utilising existing renosterveld for other purposes is lower 
than their current income. For this reason, unless renosterveld is rezoned for other land 
use or current legislative protections in place continue to be ignored, it is at present not 
highly threatened. 
Long-term reliance cannot be placed on the present situation continuing and given the 
paucity of renosterveld, every effort should be made to preserve the remaining fragments. 
Whilst landowners generally indicate that they will keep the existing renosterveld on their 
land, they need to be motivated with incentives to do so. No single incentive was 
identified as decisive in motivating landowners to conserve but rather, a raft of 
incentives, both financial and motivationaL 
On the financial side, a municipal property rebate system is clearly attractive to farmers; 
however, while local government has the power to initiate this, its capacity to do so at 
present is uncertain. Any financial incentive would therefore also need to be supported 
by social and psychological motivators: public acknowledgement of prior stewardship, 
clear communication channels and an uncomplicated national commitment to 
conservation are all factors which this research suggests could provide the necessary 
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Conservation of Agricultural Resources Act 
City of Cape Town 
Cape Metropolitan Area 
European Union 
Geographic Information System 
Integrated Development Plan 
National Environmental Act 
National Farmers Federation 











8.2 Identified renosterveld sites 
CAPETOWN I 
MUNICIPALITY 
SITE NAME CONTACT 
Klipvlei C Starke 
Springfontein A Beukes 
Zondagsfontein A Louw 
Uitkyk AJ Herold 
V rymansfontein B Naude 
Uitkamp Boetie Louw 
Tierhoogte C Starke 
Corona 480 County Fair 
Karnemel ksv lei County Fair - R Briers 
Meerendal D Adriaanse 
De Goede Ontmoeting 180 D Herholdt 
Rondeberg 1373 D Loubser 
Welgelegen / Koelenhof F Bonthuys 
Goedgewag F Brink 
Remhoogte H de Kok 
Ongegund 158 H de Villiers 
Leeuwendans 937 H Slabbert 
Oliphantskop H Stofberg 
La farge Quarry Tygerberg H van Zyl 
Berg-en-dal Haman 
Joostenberg Kloof r Warner 
Bloemendal J Coetzee 
Draaihoek J Herold 
Fredericks kraal 71 J Herold 
Langerug J Herold 
Matjeskuil J Lategan 
Mariedal63 J van der Spuy 
Clara Annafontein Justin Basson 
Klipheuwel K Blackenberg 
Morgenster K de Vi Iliers 
Altona K Loubser 
Bottelfontein Karstars 











SITE NAME CONTACT 
Contermanskloof L & C Stark 
Kuiperskraal Loubser Broers 
K uyperskraal 180 Loubser broers 
Mosselbank 906 Loubser broers 
Swellengift Loubser broers 
Welgegund Loubser Broers 
Koeberg M de Kok 
Koebergplaas 110 M de Kok 
Oortmanspost 49 M de Kok 
Welvergenoegd M de KokiLoubser 
Diemersdal MLouw 
Groenekloof Mamre Nature reserve 
Durbanville Golf Course Municipality 
Durbanville Race Course Municipality 
North Pine Municipality 
Sonstraal Municipality 
Stikland Municipality 
Tygerberg Nature Reserve Municipality 
Van Riebeecksplaas Municipality 
Melkbosstrand open space Municipality 
Altydgedacht 0& J Parker 
Hillcrest farm P Inglis 
Blaauwblommekloof P Kitshopf 
Matjeskuil P Louw 
Oliphantskop P van der Spuy 
Groot Phesantekraal R Brink 
Hercules Pillar S de Wit 
Goedgedacht S Hamman 
Rondeboschjes Berg S Hugo 
Spes Bona S Hugo 
Matjeskuil S Olding 
Hoogekraal 1413 S Scher 
De Grendel Sir D Graaf 
Radio 918 Small holdings 
Spieka TEnting 
Dassenvaley T Mostert 
Dasvlei T Mostert 
Mosselbank V Loubscher 
Hubertskuil W Bester 











SITE NAME CONTACT 
Oatlands WLouw 
Platrug WMelk 
Rondeberg Farm WS Pretorious 
Dassenburg not known 
Klein Zoute Rivier not known 
Kliprug not known 
Langerug not known 
Magrug not known 
Nooitgedacht not known 
Slagtersdam 470 not known 
Spuitfontein not known 
The Farm 1419 not known 
Van Schoorsdrif not known 
STELLENBOSCH MUNICIPALITY - Bottelary Hills and Renosterveld Conservancies 
Sterhuis A Kruger 
Overgaauw B van Velden 
Jordan Winery C & G Jordan 
Bellevue o Morkel 
Amperbo o Smit 
Kaapzicht o Steytler 
La Provence F Joubert 
Langverwacht Fie Roux 
Biebleblom F v d Merve 
Neetlingshof H van Zyl - manager 
Muldersbosch Hydro Holdings - M Dobrovic 
Fransmanskraal J Carinus 
Zevenwacht J Johnson 
Skoonheid J Van der Westhuizen 
Bonfoi J Van der Westhuizen 
Morgenson L'Emigre 
Kastaiinberg M Neetling 
Warwick M Ratcliffe 
Wolfkloof M Scholtz 
North Pine Municipality 
Saxenbeurg N van der Merwe 
By Den Weg P Andrag 
Tabanana P Bacon 












Wolwedans P Fasen 
Hazendal R de Lange 
Fort Simon R Uys 
Avalon S Esterhuizen 
Le Bonheur S Kotzc 
Koopmanskloof S Smit 
Delheim/Delvera S Sperling 
Mooiplaas T & L Roos 
De Goede Sukses not known 












































































INTERVIEW SCHEDULE: Ruth Parker, UCT 
WHAT MOTIVATES PRIVATE LANDOWNERS IN THE CAPE 
METROPOLITAN AREA TO SAVE RENOSTERVELD 
This questionnaire is being conducted as part of a Masters thesis 
looking at what incentives would encourage private landowners to save 
renosterveld on their land. 
Renosterveld is a type of fynbos that grows on more fertile soils - most 
renosterveld is therefore found on farms. It is now known that 
Renosterveld is an incredibly unique type of vegetation with many 
plants (mainly bulbs) that could potentially be very valuable. 
Section A: FARM DETAILS Date: 
I Name 




Telephone (h) I (w) 
(cell) I (fax) 
L-.......... 
I Email 
I Farm size (ha) 
Erf numbers 
Surveyor 












Please note: Any information you may wish to keep as confidential 
will be done so at your request. 
1. What is your main type of farming? 
1. Vineyard 5. Vegetables & fruit 
2. Dairy 6. Grain 
3. Beef cattle/sheep 7. Flowers 
4. Orchards 8. Other (please specify) ...................... .. 
2. How long have your family or company owned this land? 
1. 1 - 5 years 
2. 6 - 20 years 
3. 21 - 50 years 
4. 51 years or longer 
Section B: Retaining natural vegetation 
3. Approximately how much of your land is currently natural vegetation? (natural 
vegetation being both indigenous and non indigenous vegetation) 
(hectares) ............................... . 
4. How much of the natural vegetation on your farm is virgin land? (virgin 
meaning pristine, indigenous vegetation that has never been ploughed before) 
(hectares) ............................... . 
5. What is the main reason that your natural vegetation has not been 
ploughed? 
1. Poor quality soil 5. Development plans in process 
2. Used for grazing 6. Communications/electrical installation 
3. Geographical (slope, mountain) 7. No plans - never developed 
4. Kept for conservation 8. Other ........................................... . 
6. Which of the following best describe your future plans for the major part 
of your natural fynbos vegetation on your farm? 
1. No plans - leave as is 4. Grazing 
2. Eco-tourism / conservation plan 5. Plough for agriculture 
3. Other (please specify) .................................................................. .. 
7. If one could imagine all alien vegetation in your natural fynbos land being put to 
one side to form a dense stand - What percentage of the natural land would 
be alien vegetation? 
1. No alien vegetation 
2. 1% -10% 
3.11%-30% 
4. 31% - 60 % 
5. 61 % - 100 % 











8. How do you presently manage the removal of alien vegetation? 
1. Do not clear alien vegetation 
2. Planned alien vegetation removal using own labour 
3. Remove alien vegetation in spare time using own labour 
4. Pay outside contractor to remove alien vegetation 
5. Obtain funds under a contractual agreement to clear alien vegetation 
6. Other (please specify) ............................................................. . 
The cost of natural vegetation 
Please be honest this information will be kept strictly confidential 
9. What are your total costs per annum for managing your natural vegetation? 
Please mark the appropriate box with an X or ~ or if no cost leave blank 
Security Alien veg Fire Fencing Other 
Cost per annum Clearing 
R1 - R 1000 
R 1001 - R 3000 
R 3001 - R 6000 
R 6001 - R 10000 
> R 10000 
10. What gross income per annum do you currently obtain from your indigenous 
fynbos vegetation, if any? 
R ............... (please specify) ............................................................ . 
11. What gross income per annum do you currently obtain per hectare on your 
productive land of similar soil types as your indigenous fynbos vegetation? 
1. R 0 - R 5000 
2. R5001-R10000 
3. R 10001 - R 15 000 
4. R15001 - R 20 000 
5. > R 20 001 
12. Could you potentially expect to obtain the same income from your indigenous 
fynbos vegetation if it was used for agriculture? 
YES NO DON'T KNOW 
13. What do think would be the next best use for this fynbos land other than its 
current use? .................................................................................. . 












15. What other income per annum could you potentially expect to get from the 
indigenous vegetation on your farm (eg grazing, tourism etc) 
(Approx) R ............................ Please specify what for ................................. . 
(Approx) R ............................ Please specify what for ................................ . 
Section C : I ncentives for saving indigenous renosterveld 
The new Property Rates Bill taxes all properties on their market value. 
Each municipality now has the authority to reduce or increase municipal taxes. 
The City of Cape Town municipality has implemented a rural rates rebate of 80%. 
EXAMPLE: a monthly rates bill on a property valued at say one million rand is calculated as follows: -
Value of property R 1000 000 
Less R 50 000 rebate R 50 000 
Net value = R 950 000 
To calculate RATES = NET VALUE X 1,0782336 CENTS (950 000 x 1.0782336 cents) 
Annual rates = R 10 243.22 
Monthly rate (divide by 12) == R 853.60 
With an 80% rebate, your rates bill on R 1000000 would be R170.72 per month. 
15 T " h t t t d ow a ex en "th th f II o you ag ree WI e 0 oWln t t t ? gsa ernen s.
strongly agree unsure disagree strongly 
agree disagree 
1. I am in any case likely to save the fynbos 
(renosterveld) on my farm 
2. The 80% municipal tax rate rebate that the 
City of Cape Town is giving for agricultural 
land is sufficient 
3. A 100% municipal tax rebate for (renosterveld) 
fynbos would be an incentive to save the 
natural indigenous vegetation on my farm 
4. Free fire protection and alien clearing would 
be more of an incentive to save natural 
fynbos than a municipal rates rebate 
5. A rate rebate for saving natural vegetation, 
would impress me that the local government 
is making a conservation effort 













6.To qualify for a rate rebate or any conservation 
assistance, I am prepared to co-opt my natural 
land into a contractual conservation agreement 
17. I be would be prepared to sell my land with 
natural vegetation to a conservation agency 
18. I would be happy to allow Cape Nature Conservation I 
or another conservation organisation to 
manage the natural fynbos on my property 
9. Most farmers do not have the extra finances 
needed for managing their natural vegetation 
10. Most farmers are conservationists at heart 
16. Incentives for conserving indigenous vegetation 
Please rank these incentives on a scale from 1 -10 
1 f 10 d . f = no meen Ive = a goo meen Ive 
1. Assistance with fire management - burning 
!2. Subsided fencing costs 
3. Alien clearing at no cost to the farmer 
14. Income tax deductions for money spent on saving renosterveld 
5. Municipal rates rebates for saving renosterveld pro rata 
6. A grant or subsidy for saving renosterveld 
7. Free access or accommodation discounts to all Western Cape 
Nature Conservation Board (WCNCB) parks 
8. Public / community recognition for saving renosterveld 
(e.g. a certificate, article in magazine, etc.) 
9. An annual dinner with generous awards and prizes for farmers 
who have made a contribution to saving renosterveld 
10. More information on how & why we need to save renosterveld 
11. A renosterveld eco-Iabel for all farm products grown on 
'renosterveld-friend Iy' farms 
12. A conference/course for farmers on ecosystem management 
13. Regular visits from a conservation extension officer 
14. Free legal advice with regards to conservation matters 
15. Extra farm security 












Any other suggestions on possible incentives? 
Section D : Motivation to conserve renosterveld 
17.1. When you/your family think about RENOSTERVELD at its BEST - what do 
you see? What are your best IMAGES or EXPERIENCES of Cape renosterveld 
fynbos? 
17.2. What do you value most about renosterveld fynbos 
a) on your land 
b) in the Western Cape 
17.3. What are the BEST reasons/ideas you can think of for 
keeping renosterveld fynbos? 
17.4. What are the BEST reasons/ideas you can think of for 











17.5. What would be the benefit of saving renosterveld fynbos? 
17.6. What would you like to see happen to renosterveld in the FUTURE so that 
your family can experience natural, indigenous Cape fynbos at its best? 
17.7. What do you suggest/feel could be done to see that this happens i.e. 
renosterveld is appreciated by current and future generations in the Cape and 
South Africa? 
This research is being conducted as part of a Masters thesis 
at the University of Cape Town. 
The material is based upon work supported by the National Research Foundation 
of South Africa under Grant number 2053674. 











8.4 NVivo Categories 
NVivo revision 1.2.142 Licensee: Ruth Parker 
Project: My Project User: Administrator Date: 2006/02/13 - 09:03:07 AM 
NODE LISTING 
Nodes in Set: All Free Nodes 
Created: 2005/11/07 - 08:24:22 AM 
Modified: 2005/11/07 - 08:24:22 AM 
Number of Nodes: 14 
1 appreciate the beauty 
Description: 
I wanted to get a sense of whether farmers appreciate what they have 
2 connection to farm 
Description: 
I wanted to see how often farmers refer back their farms 
3 consequences biodiversity loss 
Description: 
to try and establish how often farmers refer to biodiversity loss and or the consequences. Is this 
important to them? 
4 conservation or preservation 
Description: 
wonder how often farmers refer to conserve or preserve or if it is a loaded word they avoid 
5 could tell a story 
Description: 
a code added since my last analysis and I wanted to include things that could be elaborated into 
a story - its the stories we need to know to inspire people 
6 educate & public awareness 
Description: 
I wanted to get a sense of whether there is a perceived need that everyone should not only be 
educated, but made aware - does this relate to wanting more info 
7 emotional connection 
Description: 
this code gives me a sense of whether the farmer is connected to renosterveld or not - of course 
it is entirely subjective and is based on the sense I got when I interviewed the farmers 
8 fauna and flora 
Descri ption: 
an indication of whether it is flowers and animals that are mentioned or more fynbos in general 
9 future generations 
Description: 
trying to get a sense of heritage - do farmers want to preserve their land for future generations -











10 links with past 
Descri ption: 
what links farmers to the past - apart from previous generations 
11 soil erosion 
Description: 
conservation is preventing soil erosion to some farmers - I wanted to get a sense of whether 
farmers that conservation is much broader or whether it still is merely seen as soil erosion 
12 specific activity to save renosterveld 
Description: 
speaks for itself - are farmers doing or want to do anything to try and save renosterveld 
13 specific plants 
Description: 
want to know how many farmer are interested in the botanical side of their renosterveld. Stunning 
flowers in the spring is often the first thing in renosterveld to be presented to farmers - is it of 
interest to them? 
14 financial details 
Description: 
any mention of money - people always believe that is all farmers want and I needed to get an 
idea of how money minded they are 
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